stable
7
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Paul NothaftandPaul Nothaft
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167755fdec |
fix(backend): use the strong password generator for resets and enforce must_change_password (#1396)
Stable backport of
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Paul Nothaft
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d81cade7cc |
fix(security): harden four smaller gallery and contract paths, drop the unmounted photo auth middleware
- the customer contract PDF stream applies assertContractPdfPath like the
admin and public contract routes
- OG previews fall back to the site card for draft, archived and
deactivated galleries instead of leaking name, date and welcome message
- video Range requests are validated before the 206 is written; a NaN,
inverted or out-of-file range now answers 416
- share-token comparisons in gallery resolve/info use the constant-time
helper share-login already used
- middleware/photoAuth.js and the galleryAuth/photoAuth/verifyGalleryAccess
exports of middleware/auth.js were unreferenced since the static mounts
went; the auth.js copy had neither slug binding nor issuer pin, so it is
removed before anyone mounts it
(cherry picked from commit
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Paul Nothaft
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b1369068ae |
fix(security): close three middleware gaps around the API edge
Stable port of the main commit; the admin-preview and maintenance-gate
items do not exist on this branch.
- the general rate limiter skipped anyone holding any verified JWT; a
gallery token is minted for free on password-less galleries and slideshow
links, so that was an unlimited budget for every /api route. Only admin
sessions skip now
- the 50mb JSON limit is scoped to /api/admin and /api/v1; everything else
gets 2mb, so an unauthenticated body can no longer stall JSON.parse
- the CSRF Content-Type gate accepted multipart from any origin; cross-site
form posts are now rejected via Sec-Fetch-Site / Origin, with a Host match
fallback for same-origin installs that leave FRONTEND_URL unset
(cherry picked from commit
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Paul Nothaft
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cc49f6997a |
fix(auth): fail closed when the adminAuth roles join errors (stable) (#975)
Closes #968 on stable. Backport of #974. The roles-join fallback in adminAuth fabricated role_name='super_admin' on ANY database error, so a transient fault silently granted super_admin for its duration. Gate it on isMissingRolesSchema(), moved to utils/dbErrors.js and shared with apiTokenAuth, with the predicate tightened to trust SQLSTATE 42P01/42703 on Postgres and exact driver phrasing on SQLite. |
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Paul NothaftandPaul Nothaft
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4e99897313 |
fix(security): enforce event ownership on the v1 API surface (GHSA-9697) (stable) (#963)
* fix(security): enforce event ownership on the v1 API surface (GHSA-9697) Migration 081 documents the intent — 'the token's effective permissions are the intersection of the user's role permissions and the token's own scope flags' — but it was never implemented. - apiTokenAuth selected only id/username/email/role_id, so req.admin.roleName was undefined. Every ownership helper keys on roleName, so the v1 surface could not tell a super_admin from a demoted viewer. Now joins roles and emits the same req.admin shape adminAuth does, including the roles-table-missing upgrade fallback. - No v1 route applied any ownership predicate: GET /events listed every event on the instance, and GET /events/:id/share-link returned ANY event's share_token — the gallery access credential, same class as GHSA-rh8r. List is now scoped via a new scopeEventsQuery helper; the three :id routes (detail, photo upload, share-link) use the existing requireEventOwnership. Not a breaking change: tokens are minted by super_admins, who bypass ownership. It closes the case where a token's owner is later demoted — userManagementService never touches api_tokens, so the token outlived the demotion with full read of every gallery's share token. events.category.test.js stubbed apiTokenAuth without roleName; giving the stub super_admin keeps requireEventOwnership from issuing a DB query and desyncing that suite's sequenced dbMock. * fix(security): codex round 2 — intersect v1 token scopes with role permissions (GHSA-9697) Ownership scoping alone left half the documented control missing. Migration 081 defines a token's effective permissions as the INTERSECTION of the owner's role permissions and the token's scope flags; requireApiScope only ever checked the scope half. A token minted while its owner was super_admin therefore kept write access after the owner was demoted to viewer — userManagementService never touches api_tokens, so the token outlives the demotion, and ownership scoping does not help because the demoted owner still owns their events. Adds requirePermission to all six v1 routes (events.create on create, events.view on the reads, photos.upload on upload). It keys on req.admin.id, which apiTokenAuth already populates. The two existing v1 suites mock the database, so a real permission lookup 500s — they now mock the permissions middleware as pass-through, matching how they already mock apiTokenAuth. Those suites cover route logic; the intersection is pinned by the new v1TokenPermissions suite. * fix(security): codex round 3 — fail closed on the roles-join fallback (GHSA-9697) The round-2 fix loaded the token owner's role so the v1 ownership checks could tell a super_admin from a demoted viewer, and mirrored adminAuth's roles-table-missing fallback. That fallback assigns role_name = 'super_admin', and the catch around it was unconditional — so ANY failure of the joined query (connection reset, deadlock, statement timeout) elevated the token owner to super_admin as long as the simpler fallback query then succeeded. A restricted owner could ride that into listing, reading and share-tokening every event on the instance, which is the exact hole GHSA-9697 closes. The fallback is now reached only for an error that genuinely names a missing roles table/column (PG 42P01/42703 or the SQLite/MySQL wording); anything else propagates to the 500 handler. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01F211U4dDbEj4zXiyKbi9me (cherry picked from commit 53d1e5d1b3148a7f4067308b08fcdf8ddab0a39f) --------- Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <[email protected]> |
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Paul Nothaft
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081f3edcdf |
fix(security): close cross-event thumbnail leak, bulk-op ownership bypass, + hardening
Auth/access-control audit fixes (all pre-existing on main; none are regressions). Verified end-to-end where noted. HIGH - Thumbnail enumeration: photoAuth granted any gallery token access to any flat /thumbnails/thumb_* file, so a visitor to one gallery could enumerate another (password-protected) gallery's entire thumbnail set. Scope thumbnail access to the token's event via photos.thumbnail_path. Live-verified: cross-event fetch now 404s, own-event still 200s. - Bulk ownership bypass: bulk-archive/bulk-delete acted on body-supplied event ids with no owner filter (single-event routes enforce requireEventOwnership), letting admin/editor archive or cascade-delete any event. Add filterOwnedEventIds; also guard rename + import-external; tighten photo-retry to scope admin (not just editor). Fix misleading bulk-delete comment. MED - verifyGalleryAccess never checked decoded.type — assert 'gallery' instead of relying on other token types incidentally lacking eventId. - secure-images generate-token/secure-download missing denySlideshowToken (#646 bypass): a leaked slideshow token could download originals. - Frontend: AuthenticatedImage + api.ts attached the gallery bearer token to absolute/external URLs — only attach to relative same-app paths. LOW hardening - Pin algorithms:['HS256'] on all auth-boundary jwt.verify calls. - crypto.timingSafeEqual for share-token + HMAC compares (utils/timingSafe). - Remove dead photoAuth import in galleryFeedback. Tests: new regression suites for thumbnail scoping + filterOwnedEventIds; fixed verifyGalleryAccess.customerRevoke fixture (real customer tokens carry type:'gallery'). Full backend suite at the pre-existing baseline (5 suites/27 tests fail on main too), zero new failures. |
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Paul Nothaft
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b106da1ede |
fix(auth): /auth/session must enforce session timeout symmetrically (#350 recurrence)
Third loop fix in the same /admin/login → /admin/dashboard → /admin/login pattern as #355 and #363. Reported on v3.39.1-beta.0 — the loop returns after a server restart or after an idle gap longer than the configured session timeout. ## Root cause (server) `sessionTimeoutMiddleware` is mounted on `/api/admin` (server.js:411). It rejects with `401 SESSION_TIMEOUT` when either: - the in-memory `lastActivity` for the token is older than the timeout, or - this is the first request with this token AND the token's `iat` is older than the timeout (post-restart guard). `/auth/session` lives under `/api/auth/session`, NOT under `/api/admin`, so the middleware never runs for it. Result: an idle/old-iat admin token returns `valid: true` from `/auth/session` while every protected endpoint immediately rejects it with `401 SESSION_TIMEOUT`. Frontend's 401 interceptor hard-redirects to `/admin/login`, `/auth/session` says valid again, loop closes — exact same shape as the previous two asymmetries the symmetry pass missed. Fix: add a non-mutating `isSessionExpired(token, decoded)` helper to `middleware/sessionTimeout.js` that reads the same in-memory map and applies the same lastActivity / iat-vs-timeout logic as the middleware, without updating the map (the middleware is the only place that records activity; `/auth/session` is read-only by design). `/auth/session` calls the helper for `decoded.type === 'admin'` after the existing admin-existence and password-change checks. Same try/catch fall-through pattern as the prior fixes so a missing/broken helper doesn't fail-closed during early bootstrap or in test stubs. ## Root cause (client race amplifying the loop) Even with the server fix, the previous `useSessionTimeout` hook called `AdminAuthContext.logout()` which dispatches `POST /auth/logout` fire-and-forget AND has its own `finally { window.location.href }`, then immediately set `window.location.href = '/admin/login?session=expired'` on top. Two consequences: - The cookie wasn't reliably cleared before the new page loaded — if any /auth/session asymmetry slipped through, the loop replayed inside the same tab. New-tab and "refresh several times" "fixes" were just the logout request eventually completing. - Two redirects raced; sometimes the `?session=expired` query was dropped, breaking the login-page toast. Fix: rewrite the hook to (a) await `POST /auth/logout` so the cookie is guaranteed cleared, (b) clear `sessionStorage.admin_user` directly instead of going through AdminAuthContext.logout (which has the side-effect redirect we don't want), and (c) navigate exactly once with the `?session=expired` query. ## Tests - `__tests__/routes/authSession.symmetry.test.js` — 4 new cases under a `session-timeout symmetry` describe block: helper says expired → valid:false; helper says active → valid:true; helper not called for gallery tokens; helper throws → fall through to valid:true (defensive). Existing 9 tests still pass (mock now includes `isSessionExpired: jest.fn(() => Promise.resolve(false))` as the default). - `__tests__/middleware/sessionTimeout.isSessionExpired.test.js` — 7 new unit tests for the helper itself: fresh token / old-iat / recently-active / null-input / no-mutation / 60-min default boundary cases. 20 cases total, all green. Lint clean on every touched file. |