feat(auth): OIDC role mapping + login policy — phase 2 (#798) (#854)

* feat(auth): OIDC role mapping + login policy — phase 2 (#798)

Role mapping: configurable dot-path roles claim (Keycloak realm_access.roles,
Authentik/Pocket ID groups, Entra roles), IdP-value → PicPeak-role mapping
table validated against the roles table, re-evaluated on every SSO login with
highest-priority-wins on multiple matches. The last active super_admin is
never demoted. Optional require-mapped-role policy refuses logins whose token
maps to no role (sso_error=no_role).

Login policy: oidc_disable_local_login makes the API refuse password logins
(403 LOCAL_LOGIN_DISABLED) and the login page render SSO-only; only effective
while SSO is enabled+configured, and OIDC_BREAK_GLASS=true always re-opens
local login. Public settings expose the EFFECTIVE flag only.

Settings UI: Role-mapping card (claim path, mapping rows editor, strict
toggle) and Login-policy card with break-glass hint, EN+DE.

14 new integration tests over the mock IdP.

* fix(auth): harden phase-2 review findings (#798)

- memoize the scrypt-derived OIDC key and serve /public/settings from a
  10s-TTL flag cache — the unauthenticated endpoint no longer pays a
  13-key config read + blocking scryptSync per request (login route
  still checks uncached)
- make the last-super-admin demotion guard atomic (FOR UPDATE on the
  active super rows) — concurrent mapped callbacks could previously
  both count 2 and demote both supers
- own-property lookup in role mapping: IdP values like `constructor`
  now count as unmapped instead of corrupting the roles query
- SsoTab clears oidc_disable_local_login in the same save that turns
  SSO off — the full-form payload otherwise hit the server-side 400

* fix(auth): guarantee break-glass reachability for SSO-only mode (#798)

- wire OIDC_BREAK_GLASS and OIDC_ENCRYPTION_KEY through the quick-start
  docker-compose.yml env allowlist (production compose already passes
  .env via env_file) and document both in .env.example
- refuse enabling oidc_disable_local_login unless an active
  local-password super_admin exists: OIDC_BREAK_GLASS only re-opens the
  password route, which OIDC-owned accounts can never use, and
  settings.edit is super_admin-only — an all-OIDC instance would be
  unrecoverable during an IdP outage

* fix(auth): close SSO-only lockout gaps from review round 3 (#798)

- role sync never demotes the last active LOCAL-password super_admin
  (an OIDC-owned super does not count as break-glass), and
  isLocalLoginDisabled() disarms itself when no such account remains —
  self-healing against manual demotion/deactivation/deletion paths
- the local-super save-time check now validates the MERGED state, so
  re-enabling SSO with a stored disable flag is checked too
- ALL oidc_* keys are reserved from the generic settings upserts/reads
  (prefix match) — policy and mapping invariants can only go through
  the validated PUT /sso
- /admin/login/mfa re-checks the policy so an mfa_pending token minted
  before the flip cannot complete into a local session

---------

Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <[email protected]>

docker-compose.yml

@@ -63,6 +63,11 @@ services:
       # Public API origin for split-origin deployments (#798 SSO redirect_uri).
       # Empty = same origin as FRONTEND_URL (the standard proxied setup).
       - API_URL=${API_URL:-}
+      # OIDC SSO (#798): key for the client secret at rest (falls back to
+      # JWT_SECRET) and the break-glass override that re-enables local
+      # password login when the IdP is down while SSO-only mode is active.
+      - OIDC_ENCRYPTION_KEY=${OIDC_ENCRYPTION_KEY:-}
+      - OIDC_BREAK_GLASS=${OIDC_BREAK_GLASS:-}
       - ADMIN_URL=${ADMIN_URL:-http://localhost:3001}
       - TZ=${TZ:-UTC}
       - STORAGE_PATH=/app/storage