feat(auth): OIDC SSO for admin users — phase 1 (#798)

Authorization-code + PKCE against a single configurable IdP via openid-client v5, with JIT provisioning. Verified end-to-end against a real Keycloak 26 (realm + confidential client + verified-email user): settings → discovery test → login button → Keycloak → dashboard. Backend: - migration 162: admin_users.auth_provider ('local' default) + external_subject, composite unique index - oidcService: settings-driven config (client secret AES-256-GCM at rest, mfaService pattern, OIDC_ENCRYPTION_KEY fallback JWT_SECRET), cached discovery, sub-based identity binding — email linking of existing admins only with email_verified=true; JIT behind oidc_autoprovision with configurable default role and an unusable random password hash - GET /api/auth/admin/sso/login + /callback: state/nonce/PKCE verifier cross the redirect in a 10-min signed httpOnly SameSite=Lax cookie; the callback reuses the local login's session establishment (completeAdminLogin split into establishAdminSession + JSON wrapper) so SSO sessions are identical downstream; every failure lands on /admin/login?sso_error=<key> as a translated toast - dedicated /admin/settings/sso GET/PUT/test endpoints (secret write-only, redacted to a set-flag; registered ABOVE the generic /:type matcher which would shadow them); oidc_client_secret added to the reserved keys stripped from generic settings upserts - public settings expose only oidc_enabled + oidc_button_label for the login page Frontend: - Settings → Single Sign-On (OIDC) tab: issuer/client/secret, scopes, autoprovision + default role, button label, enable toggle, redirect URI copy box, server-side discovery test - login page: SSO button (custom label) when enabled; sso_error query param surfaced as translated toasts; EN+DE i18n Tests: 11 integration cases against an in-process mock IdP (real discovery/JWKS/PKCE/ID-token validation) — JIT on/off, sub-vs-email binding, unverified-email rejection, deactivated admin, missing/forged state cookie, nonce tamper, secret encryption round-trip, disabled 404. MFA is delegated to the IdP on the SSO path; local login stays available as break-glass. Role-claim mapping and logout-to-IdP follow in phase 2/3.
2026-07-16 08:54:26 +02:00
parent f0cdcddb92
commit ed5fc5ad5c
17 changed files with 1507 additions and 18 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+/**
+ * Minimal in-process OIDC provider for integration tests (#798).
+ *
+ * Serves just enough of the spec for openid-client's full validation to
+ * pass: discovery, JWKS (RS256), authorization endpoint (immediate redirect,
+ * no login UI), and token endpoint (authorization_code + PKCE). Claims for
+ * the next login are scripted per test via `setNextUser()`.
+ *
+ * Runs on an ephemeral localhost port over plain http — the service allows
+ * that in NODE_ENV=test only.
+ */
+
+const http = require('http');
+const crypto = require('crypto');
+const { URL } = require('url');
+
+function b64url(input) {
+  return Buffer.from(input).toString('base64url');
+}
+
+class MockOidcProvider {
+  constructor() {
+    const { publicKey, privateKey } = crypto.generateKeyPairSync('rsa', { modulusLength: 2048 });
+    this.privateKey = privateKey;
+    this.publicJwk = publicKey.export({ format: 'jwk' });
+    this.publicJwk.kid = 'test-key-1';
+    this.publicJwk.alg = 'RS256';
+    this.publicJwk.use = 'sig';
+
+    this.clientId = 'picpeak-test';
+    this.clientSecret = 'test-client-secret';
+    this.codes = new Map(); // code -> { nonce, redirectUri, codeChallenge, user }
+    this.nextUser = { sub: 'user-1', email: '[email protected]', email_verified: true };
+    // Test hooks:
+    this.tamperNonce = false; // sign the ID token with a WRONG nonce
+    this.server = null;
+    this.issuer = null;
+  }
+
+  setNextUser(user) {
+    this.nextUser = user;
+  }
+
+  signIdToken({ sub, nonce, extraClaims = {} }) {
+    const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
+    const header = { alg: 'RS256', kid: this.publicJwk.kid, typ: 'JWT' };
+    const payload = {
+      iss: this.issuer,
+      aud: this.clientId,
+      sub,
+      iat: now,
+      exp: now + 300,
+      nonce,
+      ...extraClaims,
+    };
+    const signingInput = `${b64url(JSON.stringify(header))}.${b64url(JSON.stringify(payload))}`;
+    const signature = crypto.sign('RSA-SHA256', Buffer.from(signingInput), this.privateKey);
+    return `${signingInput}.${signature.toString('base64url')}`;
+  }
+
+  async start() {
+    this.server = http.createServer((req, res) => this.handle(req, res));
+    await new Promise((resolve) => this.server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', resolve));
+    this.issuer = `http://127.0.0.1:${this.server.address().port}`;
+    return this.issuer;
+  }
+
+  async stop() {
+    if (this.server) await new Promise((resolve) => this.server.close(resolve));
+  }
+
+  handle(req, res) {
+    const url = new URL(req.url, this.issuer);
+    const json = (status, body) => {
+      res.writeHead(status, { 'content-type': 'application/json' });
+      res.end(JSON.stringify(body));
+    };
+
+    if (url.pathname === '/.well-known/openid-configuration') {
+      return json(200, {
+        issuer: this.issuer,
+        authorization_endpoint: `${this.issuer}/authorize`,
+        token_endpoint: `${this.issuer}/token`,
+        jwks_uri: `${this.issuer}/jwks`,
+        response_types_supported: ['code'],
+        subject_types_supported: ['public'],
+        id_token_signing_alg_values_supported: ['RS256'],
+        code_challenge_methods_supported: ['S256'],
+        token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported: ['client_secret_basic', 'client_secret_post'],
+      });
+    }
+
+    if (url.pathname === '/jwks') {
+      return json(200, { keys: [this.publicJwk] });
+    }
+
+    if (url.pathname === '/authorize') {
+      // "Log in" instantly: mint a code bound to this request's params and
+      // bounce back to the redirect_uri like a real IdP would.
+      const code = crypto.randomBytes(16).toString('base64url');
+      this.codes.set(code, {
+        nonce: url.searchParams.get('nonce'),
+        redirectUri: url.searchParams.get('redirect_uri'),
+        codeChallenge: url.searchParams.get('code_challenge'),
+        user: this.nextUser,
+      });
+      const back = new URL(url.searchParams.get('redirect_uri'));
+      back.searchParams.set('code', code);
+      back.searchParams.set('state', url.searchParams.get('state'));
+      res.writeHead(302, { location: back.href });
+      return res.end();
+    }
+
+    if (url.pathname === '/token' && req.method === 'POST') {
+      let body = '';
+      req.on('data', (c) => { body += c; });
+      req.on('end', () => {
+        const params = new URLSearchParams(body);
+        const stored = this.codes.get(params.get('code'));
+        if (!stored) return json(400, { error: 'invalid_grant' });
+        this.codes.delete(params.get('code'));
+
+        // PKCE check — S256(code_verifier) must match the challenge.
+        const verifier = params.get('code_verifier') || '';
+        const challenge = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(verifier).digest('base64url');
+        if (challenge !== stored.codeChallenge) {
+          return json(400, { error: 'invalid_grant', error_description: 'PKCE verification failed' });
+        }
+
+        const { sub, ...extraClaims } = stored.user;
+        const idToken = this.signIdToken({
+          sub,
+          nonce: this.tamperNonce ? 'tampered-nonce' : stored.nonce,
+          extraClaims,
+        });
+        return json(200, {
+          access_token: crypto.randomBytes(16).toString('base64url'),
+          token_type: 'Bearer',
+          expires_in: 300,
+          id_token: idToken,
+        });
+      });
+      return undefined;
+    }
+
+    return json(404, { error: 'not_found' });
+  }
+}
+
+module.exports = { MockOidcProvider };