showLogout was hard-coded true, so a gallery with no password showed a Logout button. Logging out of it is meaningless — no credential to drop, nothing to return to — and it stranded the visitor: GalleryPage's auto-login is a one-shot latch, so clearing the session left the page on its skeleton until a manual reload. That is the 'turns blank' in the report. The button is gated on requiresPassword || isClient || viaCustomer at both call sites. The full-page layouts render it on the callback being present rather than on a flag, so withholding the callback is how the gate reaches them. Session kind now comes from /auth/session rather than sessionStorage, which is per-tab while the cookie is per-browser: a gallery reopened in a second tab lost 'client' while the backend kept serving it as one. viaCustomer marks a portal token, which bypasses reveal mode and so is a credential that does not look like one. The public-gallery branch no longer returns the skeleton unconditionally — once auto-login has run and left us unauthenticated it shows the reason and a Retry. That state was otherwise unrecoverable, and it also swallowed loginError entirely. Merged with admin privileges: the author cannot self-approve.
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@@ -148,9 +148,9 @@ function signAdminToken({ id = 1, username = 'admin', iat, exp }) {
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);
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}
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function signGalleryToken({ eventId = 100, eventSlug = 'wedding' } = {}) {
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function signGalleryToken({ eventId = 100, eventSlug = 'wedding', ...extra } = {}) {
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return jwt.sign(
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{ eventId, eventSlug, type: 'gallery' },
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{ eventId, eventSlug, type: 'gallery', ...extra },
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process.env.JWT_SECRET,
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{ expiresIn: '1h', issuer: 'picpeak-auth' }
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);
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@@ -301,6 +301,58 @@ describe('GET /auth/session — symmetry with protected middleware', () => {
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expect(res.body.valid).toBe(true);
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});
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/**
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* What KIND of gallery session this is (#1149).
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*
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* The frontend used to keep this in sessionStorage, which is per-TAB while
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* the cookie is per-browser: a gallery reopened in a second tab lost
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* 'client' even though the backend still served it as one, and the UI hid
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* the only control that clears the privileged cookie. Reported from the
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* token so a restored session knows what it actually is.
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*/
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describe('gallery session kind', () => {
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beforeEach(() => {
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fakeDb.events.push({
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id: 100,
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slug: 'wedding',
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is_active: true,
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is_archived: false,
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expires_at: new Date(Date.now() + 86400_000),
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});
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});
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it('reports a PIN-client session as client', async () => {
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const res = await request(makeApp())
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.get('/auth/session?slug=wedding')
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.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${signGalleryToken({ accessLevel: 'client' })}`);
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expect(res.body.valid).toBe(true);
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expect(res.body.accessLevel).toBe('client');
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expect(res.body.viaCustomer).toBe(false);
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});
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it('reports a customer-portal session, which looks like a guest', async () => {
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// via:'customer' runs at accessLevel 'guest' but bypasses reveal mode,
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// so it is a credential that does not look like one.
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const res = await request(makeApp())
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.get('/auth/session?slug=wedding')
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.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${signGalleryToken({ via: 'customer', customerId: 7 })}`);
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expect(res.body.valid).toBe(true);
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expect(res.body.accessLevel).toBe('guest');
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expect(res.body.viaCustomer).toBe(true);
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});
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it('reports a plain guest as neither', async () => {
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// The flags have to discriminate, or they would just hand every visitor
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// a Logout button back.
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const res = await request(makeApp())
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.get('/auth/session?slug=wedding')
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.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${signGalleryToken()}`);
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expect(res.body.valid).toBe(true);
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expect(res.body.accessLevel).toBe('guest');
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expect(res.body.viaCustomer).toBe(false);
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});
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});
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it('returns valid:false when the token is revoked', async () => {
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fakeDb.adminUsers.push({
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id: 1,
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@@ -819,6 +819,17 @@ router.get('/session', async (req, res) => {
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user: decoded.username || decoded.eventSlug,
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eventSlug: decoded.eventSlug,
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adminUsername: decoded.username,
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// What KIND of gallery session this cookie is (#1149). The frontend
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// kept this in sessionStorage, which is per-tab: reopening a gallery
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// in a second tab lost 'client' while the cookie — and therefore the
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// backend — still treated it as one. Reported from the token so a
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// restored session knows what it actually is.
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//
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// viaCustomer marks a portal-minted token. It runs at accessLevel
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// 'guest' but bypasses reveal mode, so it is a credential even though
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// it does not look like one.
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accessLevel: decoded.type === 'gallery' ? (decoded.accessLevel || 'guest') : undefined,
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viaCustomer: decoded.type === 'gallery' ? decoded.via === 'customer' : undefined,
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// Full admin payload (or null) — lets the SPA hydrate its user
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// state after a redirect-established session (SSO, #798) where no
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// login JSON response ever reached it.
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