fix(backend): set multer's fieldArrayIndexLimit to actually close CVE-2026-82333
The advisory is explicit that the 2.3.0 version bump alone doesn't remediate the array-index DoS — an app must also set limits.fieldArrayIndexLimit. Set it on every multer instance, sized to what each route's form actually needs.
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@@ -92,6 +92,16 @@ const handleKnownErrors = (err) => {
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return new ValidationError('Unexpected file field');
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}
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// CVE-2026-82333: multer 2.3.0's fieldArrayIndexLimit rejects multipart
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// field names with an oversized bracket array index (e.g. `a[99999999]`)
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// before the DoS-prone field parser runs. Without this mapping the
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// resulting MulterError has no .statusCode/.status and falls through to
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// a 500 here, so map it to a proper 400 like the other multer limits.
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if (err.code === 'LIMIT_FIELD_ARRAY_INDEX') {
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const { ValidationError } = require('../utils/errors');
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return new ValidationError('Field name array index too large');
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}
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return err;
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};
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