fix(security): sanitize chunked-upload filename (GHSA-pc72-jf53-w28j)

The chunked video upload stored req.body.filename unmodified and later built
the merged path as path.join(tempDir, uploadMeta.filename). path.join does not
neutralise '../', so a filename like '../../uploads/logos/evil.svg' escaped the
temp dir on merge and overwrote arbitrary files. Requires admin with
photos.upload.

Fix: path.basename() the client filename in initializeUpload() and reject
names that collapse to nothing. Adds a regression test.
This commit is contained in:
Paul Nothaft
2026-07-16 10:56:15 +02:00
parent cde0b465a9
commit dcfcb67f9b
2 changed files with 64 additions and 2 deletions
+12 -2
View File
@@ -30,6 +30,16 @@ async function initializeUpload(options) {
totalChunks
} = options;
// Strip any directory components from the client-supplied filename. It is
// later joined onto the temp merge dir (path.join(tempDir, filename)), and
// path.join does NOT neutralise `../` — a filename like `../../uploads/
// logos/evil.svg` would escape the temp dir and overwrite arbitrary files
// (GHSA-pc72-jf53-w28j). basename() collapses it to the leaf name only.
const safeFilename = path.basename(String(filename || ''));
if (!safeFilename || safeFilename === '.' || safeFilename === '..') {
throw new Error('Invalid filename');
}
// Generate unique upload ID
const uploadId = crypto.randomUUID();
@@ -43,7 +53,7 @@ async function initializeUpload(options) {
// Store upload metadata
const uploadMeta = {
uploadId,
filename,
filename: safeFilename,
fileSize,
mimeType,
eventId,
@@ -59,7 +69,7 @@ async function initializeUpload(options) {
logger.info('Initialized chunked upload', {
uploadId,
filename,
filename: safeFilename,
fileSize,
expectedChunks,
eventId