fix(security): sanitize chunked-upload filename (GHSA-pc72-jf53-w28j)
The chunked video upload stored req.body.filename unmodified and later built the merged path as path.join(tempDir, uploadMeta.filename). path.join does not neutralise '../', so a filename like '../../uploads/logos/evil.svg' escaped the temp dir on merge and overwrote arbitrary files. Requires admin with photos.upload. Fix: path.basename() the client filename in initializeUpload() and reject names that collapse to nothing. Adds a regression test.
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@@ -30,6 +30,16 @@ async function initializeUpload(options) {
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totalChunks
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} = options;
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// Strip any directory components from the client-supplied filename. It is
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// later joined onto the temp merge dir (path.join(tempDir, filename)), and
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// path.join does NOT neutralise `../` — a filename like `../../uploads/
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// logos/evil.svg` would escape the temp dir and overwrite arbitrary files
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// (GHSA-pc72-jf53-w28j). basename() collapses it to the leaf name only.
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const safeFilename = path.basename(String(filename || ''));
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if (!safeFilename || safeFilename === '.' || safeFilename === '..') {
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throw new Error('Invalid filename');
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}
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// Generate unique upload ID
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const uploadId = crypto.randomUUID();
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@@ -43,7 +53,7 @@ async function initializeUpload(options) {
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// Store upload metadata
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const uploadMeta = {
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uploadId,
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filename,
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filename: safeFilename,
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fileSize,
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mimeType,
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eventId,
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@@ -59,7 +69,7 @@ async function initializeUpload(options) {
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logger.info('Initialized chunked upload', {
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uploadId,
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filename,
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filename: safeFilename,
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fileSize,
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expectedChunks,
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eventId
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