fix(security): resolve DNS before vetting external hostnames (SSRF cluster) (#941)
* fix(security): resolve DNS before vetting external hostnames (SSRF cluster) * fix(security): harden SSRF fix per review (rsync backup path, S3 config-save, webhook transient-DNS retry) * fix(security): S3 endpoint validation on any endpoint update + no-connect on unresolved webhook host (codex r2) --------- Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <[email protected]>
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co-authored by
Paul Nothaft
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8a87c9274b
commit
b7005692b3
@@ -63,14 +63,33 @@ router.put('/config', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.create'), async (req,
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}
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break;
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case 's3':
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if (!updates.backup_s3_endpoint || !updates.backup_s3_bucket ||
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if (!updates.backup_s3_endpoint || !updates.backup_s3_bucket ||
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!updates.backup_s3_access_key || !updates.backup_s3_secret_key) {
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return res.status(400).json({ error: 'S3 backup requires endpoint, bucket, and credentials' });
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}
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break;
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}
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}
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// SSRF: validate an S3 endpoint whenever one is supplied — NOT only when
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// the payload also flips backup_destination_type to 's3'. The PUT
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// persists every backup_* field independently, so with S3 already
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// selected a caller could PATCH just backup_s3_endpoint to a
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// private-resolving host; the management ops (manifest, bucket/file
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// browse, cleanup, test-upload) then connect without going through
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// testConnection. Prod-only; dev points at localhost MinIO deliberately.
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if (process.env.NODE_ENV === 'production'
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&& updates.backup_s3_endpoint && updates.backup_s3_endpoint !== '••••••••') {
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const rawEndpoint = updates.backup_s3_endpoint;
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const withProto = /^https?:\/\//.test(rawEndpoint) ? rawEndpoint : `https://${rawEndpoint}`;
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let epHost = null;
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try { epHost = new URL(withProto).hostname; } catch { epHost = null; }
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const { isHostAllowed } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
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if (!epHost || !(await isHostAllowed(epHost))) {
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return res.status(400).json({ error: 'S3 endpoint resolves to a private or internal network address' });
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}
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}
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// Update settings
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for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(updates)) {
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// An unchanged secret round-trips as the GET mask sentinel — keep the
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@@ -364,9 +383,11 @@ router.post('/test-connection', adminAuth, requirePermission('backup.create'), a
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break;
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}
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// SSRF protection: block connections to private/internal addresses
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const { isPrivateIP } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
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if (isPrivateIP(host)) {
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// SSRF protection: resolve the host and block any private/internal
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// address. ssh does its own DNS at connect time, so a literal-only
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// check let a hostname resolving to an internal IP through (#GHSA-4jh8).
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const { isHostAllowed } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
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if (!(await isHostAllowed(host))) {
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res.json({ success: false, message: 'Host cannot be a private or internal network address' });
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break;
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}
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@@ -66,9 +66,11 @@ router.post('/config', [
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tls_reject_unauthorized
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} = req.body;
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// Validate SMTP host is not a private/internal address (SSRF protection)
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const { isPrivateIP } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
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if (isPrivateIP(smtp_host)) {
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// Validate SMTP host is not a private/internal address (SSRF protection).
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// Resolves DNS so a public-looking hostname pointing at an internal IP
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// is caught, not just literal private addresses (#GHSA-ch64).
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const { isHostAllowed } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
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if (!(await isHostAllowed(smtp_host))) {
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return res.status(400).json({ error: 'SMTP host cannot point to a private or internal network address' });
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}
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@@ -152,8 +154,8 @@ router.post('/incoming-config', [
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const errors = validationResult(req);
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if (!errors.isEmpty()) return res.status(400).json({ errors: errors.array() });
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const { imap_host, imap_port, imap_secure, imap_user, imap_pass, imap_folder } = req.body;
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const { isPrivateIP } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
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if (isPrivateIP(imap_host)) {
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const { isHostAllowed } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
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if (!(await isHostAllowed(imap_host))) {
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return res.status(400).json({ error: 'IMAP host cannot point to a private or internal network address' });
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}
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const existing = await db('email_configs').first();
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@@ -183,8 +185,8 @@ router.post('/incoming-config/folders', adminAuth, requirePermission('email.view
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try {
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const { imap_host, imap_port, imap_secure, imap_user, imap_pass } = req.body || {};
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if (imap_host) {
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const { isPrivateIP } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
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if (isPrivateIP(imap_host)) {
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const { isHostAllowed } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
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if (!(await isHostAllowed(imap_host))) {
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return res.status(400).json({ error: 'IMAP host cannot point to a private or internal network address' });
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}
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}
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@@ -205,8 +207,8 @@ router.post('/incoming-config/test', adminAuth, requirePermission('email.view'),
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try {
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const { imap_host, imap_port, imap_secure, imap_user, imap_pass, imap_folder } = req.body || {};
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if (imap_host) {
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const { isPrivateIP } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
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if (isPrivateIP(imap_host)) {
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const { isHostAllowed } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
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if (!(await isHostAllowed(imap_host))) {
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return res.status(400).json({ error: 'IMAP host cannot point to a private or internal network address' });
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}
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}
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@@ -385,11 +387,11 @@ router.post('/accounts', adminAuth, messagingGate, requirePermission('email.edit
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if (!b.account_key) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'account_key is required' });
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// SSRF guard — mirror /config + /incoming-config: neither the IMAP nor the
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// SMTP host may point at a private/internal address.
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const { isPrivateIP } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
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if (b.imap_host && isPrivateIP(b.imap_host)) {
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const { isHostAllowed } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
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if (b.imap_host && !(await isHostAllowed(b.imap_host))) {
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return res.status(400).json({ error: 'IMAP host cannot point to a private or internal network address' });
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}
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if (b.smtp_host && isPrivateIP(b.smtp_host)) {
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if (b.smtp_host && !(await isHostAllowed(b.smtp_host))) {
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return res.status(400).json({ error: 'SMTP host cannot point to a private or internal network address' });
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}
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const patch = {
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@@ -434,8 +436,8 @@ router.post('/accounts', adminAuth, messagingGate, requirePermission('email.edit
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router.post('/accounts/test', adminAuth, messagingGate, requirePermission('email.view'), async (req, res) => {
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try {
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const b = req.body || {};
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const { isPrivateIP } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
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if (b.imap_host && isPrivateIP(b.imap_host)) {
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const { isHostAllowed } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
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if (b.imap_host && !(await isHostAllowed(b.imap_host))) {
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return res.status(400).json({ error: 'IMAP host cannot point to a private or internal network address' });
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}
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let pass = b.imap_pass;
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@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ const { body, query, validationResult } = require('express-validator');
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const { db, logActivity } = require('../database/db');
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const { adminAuth } = require('../middleware/auth');
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const { requirePermission } = require('../middleware/permissions');
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const { validateExternalUrl } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
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const { validateExternalUrlAsync } = require('../utils/networkValidation');
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const webhookService = require('../services/webhookService');
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const logger = require('../utils/logger');
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@@ -78,9 +78,9 @@ router.post(
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requirePermission('settings.edit'),
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[
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body('name').isString().trim().isLength({ min: 1, max: 100 }),
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body('url').isString().isLength({ max: 2048 }).custom((url) => {
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body('url').isString().isLength({ max: 2048 }).custom(async (url) => {
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if (ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS) return true;
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const check = validateExternalUrl(url);
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const check = await validateExternalUrlAsync(url);
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if (!check.valid) throw new Error(check.error);
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return true;
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}),
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@@ -160,9 +160,9 @@ router.put(
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requirePermission('settings.edit'),
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[
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body('name').optional().isString().trim().isLength({ min: 1, max: 100 }),
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body('url').optional().isString().isLength({ max: 2048 }).custom((url) => {
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body('url').optional().isString().isLength({ max: 2048 }).custom(async (url) => {
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if (ALLOW_PRIVATE_URLS) return true;
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const check = validateExternalUrl(url);
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const check = await validateExternalUrlAsync(url);
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if (!check.valid) throw new Error(check.error);
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return true;
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}),
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