diff --git a/backend/__tests__/middleware/securityHardeningBatch2.test.js b/backend/__tests__/middleware/securityHardeningBatch2.test.js
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..8d414afc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/backend/__tests__/middleware/securityHardeningBatch2.test.js
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+/**
+ * Second security sweep on the same branch as the password-strength DoS fix
+ * (stable port: the maintenance and admin-preview cases do not apply here).
+ * Each block pins one gap the audit found:
+ *
+ *  - the general rate limiter skipped anyone holding ANY verified JWT,
+ *    including a gallery token minted for free on password-less galleries
+ *  - the multipart branch of the CSRF Content-Type gate accepted cross-site
+ *    form posts
+ */
+const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken');
+
+process.env.JWT_SECRET = 'hardening-batch2-secret';
+
+const fake = { maintenance: 'true', revoked: false, beforeCutoff: false, admin: { id: 1, password_changed_at: null } };
+
+jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => {
+  const db = jest.fn((table) => {
+    const q = {
+      where: jest.fn().mockReturnThis(),
+      select: jest.fn().mockReturnThis(),
+      first: jest.fn(async () => {
+        if (table === 'app_settings') {
+          return { setting_key: 'general_maintenance_mode', setting_value: fake.maintenance };
+        }
+        if (table === 'admin_users') return fake.admin;
+        return null;
+      }),
+    };
+    return q;
+  });
+  return { db, withRetry: (fn) => fn() };
+});
+jest.mock('../../src/utils/logger', () => ({ error: jest.fn(), warn: jest.fn(), info: jest.fn(), debug: jest.fn() }));
+process.env.FRONTEND_URL = 'https://photos.example.com';
+
+const { isAuthenticated } = require('../../src/services/rateLimitService');
+const { multipartOriginAllowed } = require('../../src/utils/requestOrigin');
+
+const iat = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) - 10;
+const adminToken = (extra = {}) => jwt.sign({ type: 'admin', id: 1, iat, ...extra }, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { issuer: 'picpeak-auth' });
+const galleryToken = () => jwt.sign({ type: 'gallery', eventId: 1, iat }, process.env.JWT_SECRET, { issuer: 'picpeak-auth' });
+
+describe('general rate limiter skip', () => {
+  const req = (token) => ({ path: '/api/gallery/x/photos', headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${token}` }, cookies: {} });
+  it('is granted to an admin session', () => {
+    expect(isAuthenticated(req(adminToken()))).toBe(true);
+  });
+  it('is NOT granted to a gallery token', () => {
+    expect(isAuthenticated(req(galleryToken()))).toBe(false);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('multipart origin gate', () => {
+  const req = (headers) => ({ headers: { host: 'photos.example.com', ...headers } });
+  it('accepts same-origin, same-site and non-browser requests', () => {
+    expect(multipartOriginAllowed(req({ 'sec-fetch-site': 'same-origin' }))).toBe(true);
+    expect(multipartOriginAllowed(req({ 'sec-fetch-site': 'same-site' }))).toBe(true);
+    expect(multipartOriginAllowed(req({ 'sec-fetch-site': 'none' }))).toBe(true);
+    expect(multipartOriginAllowed(req({}))).toBe(true);
+    expect(multipartOriginAllowed(req({ origin: 'https://photos.example.com' }))).toBe(true);
+    // Same-origin install without FRONTEND_URL: Origin matches the Host.
+    expect(multipartOriginAllowed({ headers: { host: 'gallery.local', origin: 'http://gallery.local' } })).toBe(true);
+  });
+  it('rejects cross-site form posts', () => {
+    expect(multipartOriginAllowed(req({ 'sec-fetch-site': 'cross-site' }))).toBe(false);
+    expect(multipartOriginAllowed(req({ origin: 'https://evil.example' }))).toBe(false);
+    expect(multipartOriginAllowed(req({ origin: 'null' }))).toBe(false);
+  });
+});
diff --git a/backend/server.js b/backend/server.js
index c7e6bd09..adfc0e40 100644
--- a/backend/server.js
+++ b/backend/server.js
@@ -206,25 +206,13 @@ app.use((req, res, next) => {
 });
 
 // CORS configuration (apply only to API routes)
+const { isAllowedOrigin, multipartOriginAllowed } = require('./src/utils/requestOrigin');
+
 const corsOptions = {
   origin: function (origin, callback) {
-    const allowedOrigins = [
-      process.env.FRONTEND_URL || 'http://localhost:3005',
-      process.env.ADMIN_URL || 'http://localhost:3005'
-    ];
-
-    // In development, also allow localhost origins
-    if (process.env.NODE_ENV === 'development') {
-      allowedOrigins.push(
-        'http://localhost:5173', // Vite dev server
-        'http://localhost:3002', // Backend server
-        'http://localhost:3001', // For API testing
-        'http://localhost:3000'  // Direct backend access
-      );
-    }
-
+    // Allowlist lives in utils/requestOrigin, shared with the multipart gate.
     // Allow requests with no origin (like curl) and allow-listed origins
-    if (!origin || allowedOrigins.indexOf(origin) !== -1) {
+    if (!origin || isAllowedOrigin(origin)) {
       callback(null, true);
     } else {
       // Do not error globally; just omit CORS headers on disallowed origins
@@ -452,8 +440,14 @@ async function initializeRateLimiters() {
 }
 
 // Note: Rate limiters will be initialized after database connection
-app.use(express.json({ limit: '50mb' }));
-app.use(express.urlencoded({ extended: true, limit: '50mb' }));
+// Body limits. 50mb is only needed by the authenticated admin and API-token
+// surfaces (restore manifests, CMS and email templates, bulk operations);
+// applied globally it let any unauthenticated caller hand JSON.parse a 50mb
+// body and block the event loop. express.json skips a request whose body
+// is already parsed, so the scoped parser must run first.
+app.use(['/api/admin', '/api/v1'], express.json({ limit: '50mb' }));
+app.use(express.json({ limit: '2mb' }));
+app.use(express.urlencoded({ extended: true, limit: '2mb' }));
 
 // CSRF protection: require JSON Content-Type on mutating API requests
 // This blocks cross-origin form submissions which cannot set Content-Type: application/json
@@ -465,6 +459,14 @@ app.use('/api', (req, res, next) => {
     if (contentLength > 0 && !contentType.includes('application/json') && !contentType.includes('multipart/form-data')) {
       return res.status(415).json({ error: 'Unsupported Content-Type. Use application/json or multipart/form-data.' });
     }
+    // multipart is exactly what a cross-site <form> can send without a
+    // preflight, and in a split-origin deployment (SameSite=None) the admin
+    // cookie rides along to the upload routes. Browsers label such a
+    // submission Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site (and always send Origin on a
+    // cross-origin POST); non-browser clients send neither header and pass.
+    if (contentType.includes('multipart/form-data') && !multipartOriginAllowed(req)) {
+      return res.status(403).json({ error: 'Cross-site multipart request rejected' });
+    }
   }
   next();
 });
diff --git a/backend/src/services/rateLimitService.js b/backend/src/services/rateLimitService.js
index 028fb8a6..eb40ab8e 100644
--- a/backend/src/services/rateLimitService.js
+++ b/backend/src/services/rateLimitService.js
@@ -106,8 +106,13 @@ function isAuthenticated(req) {
       return false;
     }
 
-    // Valid token found - check type
-    req.tokenType = decoded.type; // 'admin' or 'gallery'
+    // Only an admin session earns the skip. A gallery token is minted for
+    // free on password-less galleries and slideshow links, so treating it as
+    // "authenticated" handed anyone an unlimited budget on every /api route.
+    if (decoded.type !== 'admin') {
+      return false;
+    }
+    req.tokenType = decoded.type;
     req.tokenPayload = decoded;
     
     return true;
diff --git a/backend/src/utils/requestOrigin.js b/backend/src/utils/requestOrigin.js
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..2e9a1313
--- /dev/null
+++ b/backend/src/utils/requestOrigin.js
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+/**
+ * Origin allow-listing shared by the CORS options and the multipart CSRF gate
+ * in server.js. Kept apart from server.js so it can be unit-tested without
+ * booting the app.
+ */
+function isAllowedOrigin(origin) {
+  const allowedOrigins = [
+    process.env.FRONTEND_URL || 'http://localhost:3005',
+    process.env.ADMIN_URL || 'http://localhost:3005'
+  ];
+  if (process.env.NODE_ENV === 'development') {
+    allowedOrigins.push(
+      'http://localhost:5173', // Vite dev server
+      'http://localhost:3002', // Backend server
+      'http://localhost:3001', // For API testing
+      'http://localhost:3000'  // Direct backend access
+    );
+  }
+  return allowedOrigins.indexOf(origin) !== -1;
+}
+
+// Origin check for multipart bodies (see the Content-Type gate below).
+// Same-origin installs proxy /api through nginx and may not have FRONTEND_URL
+// set, so an Origin matching the request Host is accepted alongside the CORS
+// allowlist; Sec-Fetch-Site is authoritative when a browser sends it.
+function multipartOriginAllowed(req) {
+  const site = req.headers['sec-fetch-site'];
+  if (site) return site !== 'cross-site';
+  const origin = req.headers.origin;
+  if (!origin) return true;
+  if (isAllowedOrigin(origin)) return true;
+  try {
+    return new URL(origin).host === req.headers.host;
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+
+
+module.exports = { isAllowedOrigin, multipartOriginAllowed };