Merge pull request #1295 from PicPeak/fix/post-merge-followups

fix(gallery): image-loading follow-ups — pre-load band, decode release, sanitizer dedup

backend/__tests__/services/newsletterService.sanitize.test.js

@@ -12,7 +12,9 @@ jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => ({ db: jest.fn(), logActivity: jest.fn(
 
 const {
   sanitizeCampaignBody, sanitizeCampaignCss, MAX_BODY_BYTES,
+  sanitizeInlineStylesAfterSubstitution,
 } = require('../../src/services/newsletterService');
+const { safeTemplateReplace } = require('../../src/services/emailProcessor');
 
 describe('sanitizeCampaignBody', () => {
   it('returns empty string for empty input', () => {
@@ -92,6 +94,35 @@ describe('sanitizeCampaignBody', () => {
     expect(out).not.toContain('http://evil.example');
   });
 
+  it('blocks a tracking url() hidden behind " entities', () => {
+    // sanitize-html writes `"` inside an attribute as `"`, so the CSS
+    // scanner and the recipient's browser disagreed about where strings
+    // start: the browser decodes first and reads the apostrophe as ordinary
+    // text inside a real string, then fetches the background — while the
+    // scanner saw the apostrophe open a string and skipped past the url().
+    const out = sanitizeCampaignBody(
+      `<p style="font-family:&quot;don't&quot;;background:url(https://evil.example/p.gif)">hi</p>`
+    );
+    expect(out).not.toContain('evil.example');
+  });
+
+  it('blocks a tracking url() hidden behind an escaped quote', () => {
+    const out = sanitizeCampaignBody(
+      `<p style="--m:\\';background:url(https://evil.example/p.gif)">hi</p>`
+    );
+    expect(out).not.toContain('evil.example');
+  });
+
+  it('keeps a legitimate quoted font stack, re-encoded for the attribute', () => {
+    const out = sanitizeCampaignBody(
+      `<p style="color:red;font-family:&quot;Helvetica Neue&quot;,sans-serif">hi</p>`
+    );
+    expect(out).toContain('color:red');
+    expect(out).toContain('Helvetica Neue');
+    // Re-encoded, so the attribute stays well formed rather than being cut short.
+    expect(out).not.toMatch(/style="[^"]*"[^>]*"/);
+  });
+
   it('strips expression() out of an inline style', () => {
     const out = sanitizeCampaignBody('<p style="width:expression(alert(1))">hi</p>');
     expect(out).not.toContain('expression(');
@@ -159,3 +190,46 @@ describe('sanitizeCampaignCss', () => {
     expect(css).not.toContain('</style>');
   });
 });
+
+describe('inline CSS is re-checked after template substitution', () => {
+  // The stored body is sanitized, but safeTemplateReplace rewrites it
+  // afterwards — so the string that was validated is not the string that is
+  // sent. A conditional inside a style attribute can delete the quoting that
+  // made a url() inert, which no amount of lexer correctness can catch.
+  const payload =
+    `<p style="--x:x{{#if company_name}}'{{/if}};`
+    + `background:url(https://evil.example/p.gif);`
+    + `--y:x{{#if company_name}}'{{/if}}">hi</p>`;
+
+  it('neutralises a url() that substitution would activate', () => {
+    const stored = sanitizeCampaignBody(payload);
+    // Correctly left alone at write time: the url() really is inside a CSS
+    // string while the conditionals are still in place.
+    expect(stored).toContain('evil.example');
+
+    const substituted = safeTemplateReplace(stored, { company_name: '' }, { escapeHtml: true });
+    // Expansion removed the quotes, so without the recheck this ships live.
+    expect(substituted).toMatch(/background:url\(https:\/\/evil\.example/);
+
+    const rendered = sanitizeInlineStylesAfterSubstitution(substituted);
+    expect(rendered).not.toMatch(/url\(\s*['"]?https:\/\/evil\.example/);
+    expect(rendered).toContain('background:none');
+  });
+
+  it('leaves a body without style attributes untouched', () => {
+    const html = '<p>Hello {{first_name}}</p>';
+    expect(sanitizeInlineStylesAfterSubstitution(html)).toBe(html);
+  });
+
+  it('keeps legitimate inline styles through the recheck', () => {
+    const html = '<p style="color:red;font-size:14px">hi</p>';
+    const out = sanitizeInlineStylesAfterSubstitution(html);
+    expect(out).toContain('color:red');
+    expect(out).toContain('font-size:14px');
+  });
+
+  it('is safe on empty and nullish input', () => {
+    expect(sanitizeInlineStylesAfterSubstitution('')).toBe('');
+    expect(sanitizeInlineStylesAfterSubstitution(null)).toBeNull();
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/utils/cssSanitizer.remoteUrls.test.js

@@ -221,6 +221,92 @@ describe('sanitizeCSS', () => {
     expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
   });
 
+  it.each([
+    ['a C0 control character', '\u0001'],
+    ['a NUL byte', '\u0000'],
+    ['a DEL byte', '\u007F'],
+    // Newlines are control characters for this strip, so the bypass did not
+    // need an exotic byte — ordinary-looking wrapped CSS was enough.
+    ['a newline', '\n'],
+  ])('blocks a url() that only becomes one after %s is removed', (_label, ch) => {
+    // Same token-joining hazard as the HTML-comment case above: the control
+    // strip used to run AFTER the URL scan, so `u\u0001rl(...)` was scanned
+    // as clean and then joined into a live remote request, with no warning.
+    const { sanitized, warnings } = sanitizeCSS(
+      `.a{background:u${ch}rl(https://evil.example/p.gif)}`
+    );
+    expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
+    expect(warnings.join(' ')).toContain('external URL');
+  });
+
+  it('blocks a url() hidden behind an escaped quote outside a string', () => {
+    // `\'` is an escaped identifier character, not a string opener. The
+    // scanner used to step onto the apostrophe, enter string mode, and copy
+    // the rest of the stylesheet — url() included — unexamined.
+    const { sanitized } = sanitizeCSS(
+      ".hero{--marker:\\';background:url(https://evil.example/p.gif)}"
+    );
+    expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    ['a leading escape', '.a{background:\\75rl(https://evil.example/p.gif)}'],
+    ['an escape mid-identifier', '.a{background:u\\72l(https://evil.example/p.gif)}'],
+  ])('blocks a url() spelled with %s', (_label, css) => {
+    // `\75` is the CSS escape for `u`, so a browser reads `\75rl(` as
+    // url(). The escape-outside-a-string handling has to run AFTER the
+    // identifier check, or it eats the escape and hides the token.
+    const { sanitized } = sanitizeCSS(css);
+    expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
+  });
+
+  it('blocks a url() the TAG strip would have un-quoted', () => {
+    // `<[^>]*>` deletes the span it matches, and `<">` takes a quote with it.
+    // Running that after the URL scan meant the scanner saw the url() safely
+    // inside a string and this pass then removed the quotes that made it so.
+    // URL validation has to be the last thing that looks at the text.
+    const { sanitized } = sanitizeCSS(
+      '--x:x<">;background:url(https://evil.example/p.gif);--y:x<">'
+    );
+    expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
+  });
+
+  it('does not treat NBSP as CSS whitespace inside url()', () => {
+    // JS `\s` matches U+00A0; CSS whitespace does not. Skipping it let the
+    // scanner read the following quote as a legitimate data: URI and swallow
+    // a remote url() inside the "string", while a browser sees an unquoted
+    // url-token ending at the first `)` and fetches the remote background.
+    const NBSP = '\u00a0';
+    const { sanitized } = sanitizeCSS(
+      `.a{background:url(${NBSP}"data:image/png);background:url(https://evil.example/p.gif);--x:");}`
+    );
+    expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
+  });
+
+  it('still allows ordinary CSS whitespace around a data: URI', () => {
+    const spaced = sanitizeCSS('.a{background:url( "" )}');
+    expect(spaced.sanitized).toContain('data:image/png');
+    const tabbed = sanitizeCSS('.a{background:url(\t"")}');
+    expect(tabbed.sanitized).toContain('data:image/png');
+  });
+
+  it('does not let an unterminated quote hide everything after it', () => {
+    // An unclosed quote is a parse error. Trusting it meant one stray
+    // apostrophe disabled scanning for the remainder of the stylesheet, so
+    // the safe reading is to treat it as an ordinary character and continue.
+    const { sanitized } = sanitizeCSS(
+      "p{font-family:'don't;background:url(https://evil.example/p.gif)}"
+    );
+    expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
+  });
+
+  it('still keeps legitimate quoted values and data: images intact', () => {
+    const font = sanitizeCSS('p{font-family:"Helvetica Neue",sans-serif;color:red}');
+    expect(font.sanitized).toContain('"Helvetica Neue"');
+    const data = sanitizeCSS(".a{background:url('')}");
+    expect(data.sanitized).toContain('data:image/png');
+  });
+
   it('still blocks the other forbidden patterns', () => {
     const { sanitized } = sanitizeCSS(
       '@import url("https://x/e.css"); .a{width:expression(alert(1));behavior:url(e.htc)}'

backend/src/services/newsletterService.js

@@ -141,35 +141,81 @@ function sanitizeCampaignBody(html) {
     },
   })
     // sanitize-html keeps the style ATTRIBUTE contents verbatim. Clean each.
-    .replace(/style="([^"]*)"/gi, (match, css) => {
-      const { sanitized } = sanitizeCSS(css);
-      const cleaned = stripRemoteCssUrls(sanitized);
-      return cleaned ? `style="${cleaned.replace(/"/g, '')}"` : '';
-    });
+    // sanitizeCSS blocks remote url() properly as of #1290 — it lexes the CSS
+    // rather than pattern-matching it, so the local pass this used to need is
+    // gone. Keeping a second copy would mean two definitions of "disallowed"
+    // drifting apart.
+    //
+    // Entities are decoded BEFORE the CSS is scanned, and re-encoded after.
+    // sanitize-html emits `"` inside an attribute as `"`, so the scanner
+    // and the recipient's browser otherwise disagree about where CSS strings
+    // begin: in `style="font-family:"don't";background:url(...)"`
+    // the browser decodes first and reads the apostrophe as ordinary text
+    // inside a real string, then makes the url() request — while the scanner
+    // saw the apostrophe open a string and skipped everything after it. The
+    // scanner has to be shown what the browser will actually parse.
+    .replace(STYLE_ATTRIBUTE, sanitizeStyleAttribute);
+}
+
+/** Shared by the write-time sanitize and the post-substitution recheck. */
+const STYLE_ATTRIBUTE = /style="([^"]*)"/gi;
+
+function sanitizeStyleAttribute(match, css) {
+  const { sanitized } = sanitizeCSS(decodeHtmlEntities(css));
+  return sanitized ? `style="${encodeForAttribute(sanitized)}"` : '';
 }
 
 /**
- * Remove every `url(...)` that is not an inline data: image.
+ * Re-check inline CSS AFTER template substitution.
  *
- * The shared `sanitizeCSS` *detects* a remote url() and prefixes it with a
- * `/* BLOCKED URL *\/` comment — but a CSS comment is stripped during
- * tokenization, so the declaration a mail client actually parses still
- * carries the live URL. Verified:
+ * Sanitizing runs on the stored body, but `safeTemplateReplace` rewrites it
+ * afterwards — so the string that was validated is not the string that gets
+ * sent. A conditional inside a style attribute can delete the very characters
+ * that made a URL inert:
  *
- *   sanitizeCSS('.a{background:url(https://x/p.gif)}').sanitized
- *     → '.a{background:/* BLOCKED URL *\/ url(https://x/p.gif)}'
+ *   style="--x:x{{#if company_name}}'{{/if}};background:url(https://evil…)"
  *
- * In a newsletter that is a tracking pixel delivered to every recipient, so
- * this pass actually removes the token. Scoped to the newsletter path on
- * purpose: the same weakness affects gallery custom CSS, but changing shared
- * sanitizer behaviour is a separate change with its own blast radius.
+ * At sanitize time the url() sits inside a CSS string and is correctly left
+ * alone; once the conditional is expanded the quotes are gone and the
+ * background is live. No amount of lexer correctness fixes that, because the
+ * text being lexed is not the text being delivered — the check has to run
+ * again on the final output. Substitution cannot introduce a `"` (values are
+ * HTML-escaped), so the attribute regex still matches what it should.
  */
-function stripRemoteCssUrls(css) {
-  if (!css) return '';
-  return String(css)
-    .replace(/\/\*\s*BLOCKED URL\s*\*\//gi, '')
-    .replace(/url\s*\(\s*(['"]?)([^)'"]*)\1\s*\)/gi, (match, _quote, target) =>
-      (/^data:image\/(?:jpeg|jpg|png|gif|webp)/i.test(target.trim()) ? match : 'none'));
+function sanitizeInlineStylesAfterSubstitution(html) {
+  if (!html) return html;
+  return String(html).replace(STYLE_ATTRIBUTE, sanitizeStyleAttribute);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Decode the HTML entities sanitize-html emits inside attribute values, so
+ * CSS is scanned in the form the recipient's parser will see. One pass, so
+ * `"` decodes to `"` and not to `"`.
+ */
+function decodeHtmlEntities(value) {
+  return String(value).replace(
+    /&(?:#(\d+)|#[xX]([0-9a-fA-F]+)|(quot|apos|amp|lt|gt));/g,
+    (whole, dec, hex, name) => {
+      if (dec !== undefined) {
+        const code = Number(dec);
+        return code >= 0 && code <= 0x10ffff ? String.fromCodePoint(code) : whole;
+      }
+      if (hex !== undefined) {
+        const code = parseInt(hex, 16);
+        return code >= 0 && code <= 0x10ffff ? String.fromCodePoint(code) : whole;
+      }
+      return { quot: '"', apos: '\'', amp: '&', lt: '<', gt: '>' }[name];
+    }
+  );
+}
+
+/** Re-encode a sanitized value so it is safe inside a double-quoted attribute. */
+function encodeForAttribute(value) {
+  return String(value)
+    .replace(/&/g, '&amp;')
+    .replace(/"/g, '&quot;')
+    .replace(/</g, '&lt;')
+    .replace(/>/g, '&gt;');
 }
 
 /**
@@ -178,7 +224,8 @@ function stripRemoteCssUrls(css) {
  * `javascript:` and every `url()` that is not a `data:` image.
  *
  * That is STRICTER than the issue's "https: images only" note — the shared
- * sanitizer allows no remote `url()` at all. Kept as-is rather than loosened:
+ * sanitizer allows no remote `url()` at all, and since #1290 it enforces
+ * that by lexing rather than by pattern-matching. Kept as-is rather than loosened:
  * a remote CSS url() in mail is a tracking pixel by another name, and a
  * campaign's images belong in `<img>` tags where the scheme filter sees them.
  *
@@ -187,7 +234,7 @@ function stripRemoteCssUrls(css) {
 function sanitizeCampaignCss(css) {
   if (!css) return { css: '', warnings: [] };
   const { sanitized, warnings } = sanitizeCSS(String(css));
-  return { css: stripRemoteCssUrls(sanitized), warnings };
+  return { css: sanitized, warnings };
 }
 
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -310,7 +357,12 @@ async function renderForRecipient(campaign, customer, options = {}) {
   // Substitution happens AFTER sanitizing, with escaping on: a customer's own
   // company name is untrusted text and must not be able to inject markup by
   // riding in through a variable the sanitizer never saw.
-  const body = safeTemplateReplace(safeBody, variables, { escapeHtml: true });
+  // Re-checked after substitution, not only before it: expansion can remove
+  // the quoting that made a url() inert at sanitize time. See
+  // sanitizeInlineStylesAfterSubstitution.
+  const body = sanitizeInlineStylesAfterSubstitution(
+    safeTemplateReplace(safeBody, variables, { escapeHtml: true })
+  );
   const subject = safeTemplateReplace(campaign.subject || '', variables);
 
   const { css } = sanitizeCampaignCss(campaign.body_css);
@@ -922,6 +974,7 @@ async function sendTest(campaignId, toEmail, adminId) {
 
 module.exports = {
   sanitizeCampaignBody,
+  sanitizeInlineStylesAfterSubstitution,
   sanitizeCampaignCss,
   unsubscribeToken,
   verifyUnsubscribeToken,

backend/src/utils/cssSanitizer.js

@@ -147,11 +147,27 @@ function stripDisallowedUrls(css) {
     if (input[i] === '"' || input[i] === '\'') {
       const quote = input[i];
       let j = i + 1;
+      let closed = false;
       while (j < input.length) {
         if (input[j] === '\\') { j += 2; continue; }
-        if (input[j] === quote) { j += 1; break; }
+        // A newline ends a string in CSS (it produces a bad-string token), so
+        // an unclosed quote must not run past the end of its own line.
+        if (input[j] === '\n' || input[j] === '\r' || input[j] === '\f') break;
+        if (input[j] === quote) { j += 1; closed = true; break; }
         j += 1;
       }
+      // An UNTERMINATED quote is a parse error, and trusting it is how a
+      // stray apostrophe hid everything after it: `font-family:&quot;don't`
+      // opened a string that swallowed the url() following it, while the
+      // recipient's browser — which decodes the entity first — saw the
+      // apostrophe safely inside a real string and made the request. Failing
+      // closed here means emitting the quote as an ordinary character and
+      // carrying on scanning, so a later url() is still examined.
+      if (!closed) {
+        out += input[i];
+        i += 1;
+        continue;
+      }
       out += input.slice(i, Math.min(j, input.length));
       i = Math.min(j, input.length);
       continue;
@@ -161,7 +177,7 @@ function stripDisallowedUrls(css) {
     const ident = readIdentifier(input, i);
     if (ident.end > i && decodeCssEscapes(ident.raw).toLowerCase() === 'url') {
       let j = ident.end;
-      while (j < input.length && /\s/.test(input[j])) j += 1;
+      while (j < input.length && CSS_WS.test(input[j])) j += 1;
       if (input[j] === '(') {
         const token = readUrlToken(input, j);
         if (token) {
@@ -185,6 +201,19 @@ function stripDisallowedUrls(css) {
       continue;
     }
 
+    // --- escape that does NOT begin an identifier -------------------------
+    // Ordered AFTER readIdentifier deliberately. `\75` is the escape for
+    // `u`, so `\75rl(...)` is url() to a browser — consuming the escape
+    // first would hide it from the check above, which is a bypass this
+    // branch introduced when it ran earlier. What is left for it is the
+    // `\'` case: an escaped quote that must not be read as opening a
+    // string, since that swallowed the rest of the stylesheet unscanned.
+    if (input[i] === '\\' && i + 1 < input.length) {
+      out += input.slice(i, i + 2);
+      i += 2;
+      continue;
+    }
+
     out += input[i];
     i += 1;
   }
@@ -209,6 +238,15 @@ function matchEscape(input, start) {
  * escaped Tailwind selector) is emitted byte-identical rather than silently
  * rewritten to `.w-1/2`, which is a different selector.
  */
+// CSS whitespace is exactly space, tab, LF, CR and FF. JavaScript's `\s`
+// is NOT the same set — it also matches NBSP and the other Unicode spaces,
+// and that difference was a bypass: in `url(\u00a0"data:image/png);...")`
+// the scanner skipped the NBSP as whitespace and read the following quote as
+// a legitimate quoted data: URI, swallowing a remote url() inside it. A
+// browser treats NBSP as an ordinary character, making that an UNQUOTED
+// url-token that ends at the first `)` — leaving the remote background live.
+const CSS_WS = /[ \t\n\r\f]/;
+
 function readIdentifier(input, start) {
   let j = start;
   let raw = '';
@@ -228,7 +266,7 @@ function readIdentifier(input, start) {
 function readUrlToken(input, openParen) {
   let j = openParen + 1;
   let target = '';
-  while (j < input.length && /\s/.test(input[j])) j += 1;
+  while (j < input.length && CSS_WS.test(input[j])) j += 1;
 
   if (input[j] === '"' || input[j] === '\'') {
     // Quoted: the quote closes the value, so ")" inside it is content.
@@ -249,7 +287,7 @@ function readUrlToken(input, openParen) {
     }
   }
 
-  while (j < input.length && /\s/.test(input[j])) j += 1;
+  while (j < input.length && CSS_WS.test(input[j])) j += 1;
   // Unterminated url( — malformed. Leave it alone rather than swallowing the
   // remainder of the stylesheet.
   if (input[j] !== ')') return null;
@@ -291,12 +329,35 @@ function sanitizeCSS(cssContent) {
   // Remove HTML comments that might be used for injection
   sanitized = sanitized.replace(/<!--[\s\S]*?-->/g, '');
 
-  // URLs are scanned AFTER the comment strip, not before. Removing
-  // `<!--x-->` from `u<!--x-->rl(https://evil.example/p.gif)` JOINS the
-  // remaining characters into a live `url(...)` — so a scan that ran first
-  // saw no token, reported the input clean, and the transformation below it
-  // then produced exactly the request the scan was there to prevent. Any
-  // pass that can join tokens has to happen before validation, not after.
+  // Remove control characters BEFORE the URL scan. This is the same
+  // token-joining hazard as the HTML-comment strip above: dropping the
+  // \u0001 from `u\u0001rl(https://evil.example/p.gif)` joins the remainder
+  // into a live `url(...)`, so a scan that ran first saw no token and
+  // reported the input clean. Newlines are control characters too, which
+  // made `u\nrl(...)` the same bypass in ordinary-looking CSS.
+  // eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex -- intentional: strips control chars from untrusted CSS
+  sanitized = sanitized.replace(/[\u0000-\u001F\u007F]/g, '');
+
+  // URLs are scanned AFTER the comment and control-character strips, not
+  // before. Removing `<!--x-->` from `u<!--x-->rl(https://evil.example/p.gif)`
+  // JOINS the remaining characters into a live `url(...)` — so a scan that
+  // ran first saw no token, reported the input clean, and the transformation
+  // below it then produced exactly the request the scan was there to
+  // prevent. Any pass that can join tokens has to happen before validation,
+  // not after.
+  // Remove any remaining script-like content. This is the LAST pass that can
+  // move text, and so it must run before the URL scan, not after: it deletes
+  // the matched span, and a span like `<">` takes a quote with it. That is
+  // how `--x:x<">;background:url(https://evil.example/p.gif);--y:x<">` shipped
+  // a live background — the scanner saw the url() safely inside a string, and
+  // this line then removed the quotes that made it so.
+  sanitized = sanitized.replace(/<[^>]*>/g, '/* BLOCKED TAG */');
+
+  // URL validation runs LAST, deliberately. Every pass above rewrites the
+  // text, and each one that did so after this point has produced a bypass:
+  // the HTML-comment strip (#1290), the control-character strip, and the tag
+  // strip immediately above. Validating anything other than the final bytes
+  // means validating a string that is not the one that gets served.
   const urlPass = stripDisallowedUrls(sanitized);
   if (urlPass.blocked > 0) {
     warnings.push(
@@ -306,13 +367,6 @@ function sanitizeCSS(cssContent) {
     sanitized = urlPass.sanitized;
   }
 
-  // Remove control characters
-  // eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex -- intentional: strips control chars from untrusted CSS
-  sanitized = sanitized.replace(/[\u0000-\u001F\u007F]/g, '');
-
-  // Remove any remaining script-like content
-  sanitized = sanitized.replace(/<[^>]*>/g, '/* BLOCKED TAG */');
-
   return { sanitized: sanitized.trim(), warnings };
 }
 

frontend/src/components/common/AuthenticatedImage.tsx

@@ -78,14 +78,16 @@ export const AuthenticatedImage: React.FC<AuthenticatedImageProps> = ({
   const imageRef = useRef<HTMLImageElement | null>(null);
 
   // Draw image to canvas when canvas rendering is enabled
+  // Returns whether the pixels actually made it onto the canvas, so the
+  // caller knows if the source image is still needed (#1287).
   const drawToCanvas = useCallback(() => {
-    if (!useCanvasRendering || !canvasRef.current || !imageRef.current) return;
+    if (!useCanvasRendering || !canvasRef.current || !imageRef.current) return false;
 
     const canvas = canvasRef.current;
     const img = imageRef.current;
     const ctx = canvas.getContext('2d');
 
-    if (!ctx || !img.complete || img.naturalWidth === 0) return;
+    if (!ctx || !img.complete || img.naturalWidth === 0) return false;
 
     // Set canvas dimensions to match image
     canvas.width = img.naturalWidth;
@@ -95,6 +97,7 @@ export const AuthenticatedImage: React.FC<AuthenticatedImageProps> = ({
     ctx.drawImage(img, 0, 0);
 
     setCanvasReady(true);
+    return true;
   }, [useCanvasRendering]);
 
   useEffect(() => {
@@ -251,7 +254,26 @@ export const AuthenticatedImage: React.FC<AuthenticatedImageProps> = ({
 
     img.onload = () => {
       imageRef.current = img;
-      drawToCanvas();
+      const drawn = drawToCanvas();
+      // Once drawImage has copied the pixels into the canvas the source
+      // decode is dead weight, so drop it here rather than at unmount. The
+      // grid is not virtualised — a 546-photo event mounts 546 of these and
+      // none of them unmount while the gallery is open — so a cleanup-only
+      // release never actually runs for the case it was meant to fix
+      // (#1287). Nothing redraws from `imageRef` afterwards: drawToCanvas
+      // has this one caller.
+      if (drawn) {
+        // Handlers off BEFORE the src goes. Measured in Chromium and WebKit:
+        // neither fires `error` when the attribute is removed after a
+        // successful load, so this is not fixing an observed bug — but if any
+        // engine ever did, `onerror` would set canvasFailed, swap the canvas
+        // for a plain <img>, and decode the image a second time, which is the
+        // exact opposite of what this release is for. The ordering is free.
+        img.onload = null;
+        img.onerror = null;
+        imageRef.current = null;
+        img.removeAttribute('src');
+      }
       onLoad?.();
     };
 
@@ -266,6 +288,17 @@ export const AuthenticatedImage: React.FC<AuthenticatedImageProps> = ({
     return () => {
       img.onload = null;
       img.onerror = null;
+      // Fallback release for the paths the onload handler above cannot
+      // cover: the draw failed, or the source changed / the component
+      // unmounted before onload ever fired. `imageRef` is what drawToCanvas
+      // reads and it was never cleared, so a detached Image — and the decode
+      // behind it — stayed pinned by a live JS reference. A decoded <img> in
+      // the document is evictable under memory pressure; one held by a ref
+      // is not.
+      if (imageRef.current === img) {
+        imageRef.current = null;
+      }
+      img.removeAttribute('src');
     };
   }, [imageSrc, useCanvasRendering, drawToCanvas, onLoad]);
 

frontend/src/components/common/__tests__/AuthenticatedImage.canvasRelease.test.tsx

@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+/**
+ * Canvas-mode memory release (#1287).
+ *
+ * In canvas mode the component keeps a detached `Image` in `imageRef` so
+ * `drawToCanvas` can read it. The effect cleanup nulled `onload`/`onerror`
+ * but never cleared that ref, so the Image — and the decoded bitmap behind
+ * it — stayed pinned by a live JS reference for the component's lifetime.
+ *
+ * That is not academic at gallery scale. The photo grid is NOT virtualised:
+ * a 546-photo event mounts 546 of these and none ever unmount, so nothing was
+ * ever released. A decoded <img> in the document is evictable under memory
+ * pressure; one held by a ref is not.
+ */
+import { render, waitFor } from '@testing-library/react';
+import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach, afterEach } from 'vitest';
+
+vi.mock('../../../utils/galleryAuthStorage', () => ({
+  getActiveGallerySlug: () => 'demo',
+  getGalleryToken: () => 'token',
+  inferGallerySlugFromLocation: () => 'demo',
+  resolveSlugFromRequestUrl: () => 'demo',
+}));
+vi.mock('../../../utils/url', () => ({ buildResourceUrl: (u: string) => `http://localhost${u}` }));
+
+import { AuthenticatedImage } from '../AuthenticatedImage';
+
+/** Every Image the component constructs, so the test can inspect them. */
+const created: HTMLImageElement[] = [];
+let createObjectURL: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>;
+let revokeObjectURL: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>;
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+  created.length = 0;
+  vi.stubGlobal('fetch', vi.fn(async () => ({
+    ok: true,
+    blob: async () => new Blob(['x'], { type: 'image/png' }),
+  })));
+  // Patch the two methods rather than replacing URL — spreading the
+  // constructor loses its prototype and breaks every `new URL(...)`.
+  // Unique per call: the canvas effect keys off `imageSrc`, so a constant
+  // URL would make a src change look like no change at all.
+  let n = 0;
+  createObjectURL = vi.fn(() => `blob:mock-url-${++n}`);
+  revokeObjectURL = vi.fn();
+  URL.createObjectURL = createObjectURL as unknown as typeof URL.createObjectURL;
+  URL.revokeObjectURL = revokeObjectURL as unknown as typeof URL.revokeObjectURL;
+
+  const RealImage = globalThis.Image;
+  vi.stubGlobal('Image', class extends RealImage {
+    constructor() {
+      super();
+      created.push(this as unknown as HTMLImageElement);
+      // jsdom leaves these at 0/false for a blob: src, which makes
+      // drawToCanvas bail before it draws. Present a decoded image so the
+      // draw path is reachable.
+      Object.defineProperty(this, 'complete', { get: () => true });
+      Object.defineProperty(this, 'naturalWidth', { get: () => 10 });
+      Object.defineProperty(this, 'naturalHeight', { get: () => 10 });
+      // jsdom never fires load for a blob: src, so drive it manually.
+      setTimeout(() => this.onload?.(new Event('load')), 0);
+    }
+  });
+});
+
+afterEach(() => vi.unstubAllGlobals());
+
+describe('AuthenticatedImage canvas mode', () => {
+  it('releases the decoded image as soon as it is drawn, without waiting for unmount', async () => {
+    // The case this whole change exists for. Every other test here asserts
+    // release on unmount or src change — neither of which happens to a grid
+    // tile, because the grid is not virtualised and the tiles stay mounted
+    // for as long as the gallery is open. Once drawImage has copied the
+    // pixels the source decode is dead weight and must go immediately.
+    const ctx = { drawImage: vi.fn() };
+    const getContext = vi
+      .spyOn(HTMLCanvasElement.prototype, 'getContext')
+      .mockReturnValue(ctx as unknown as CanvasRenderingContext2D);
+
+    render(
+      <AuthenticatedImage src="/api/gallery/demo/thumbnail/1" alt="t" useCanvasRendering />
+    );
+
+    await waitFor(() => expect(created.length).toBeGreaterThan(0));
+    const img = created[0];
+
+    await waitFor(() => expect(ctx.drawImage).toHaveBeenCalled());
+    // Still mounted, still the same src — and already released.
+    await waitFor(() => expect(img.getAttribute('src')).toBeNull());
+
+    getContext.mockRestore();
+  });
+
+  it('releases the decoded image on unmount', async () => {
+    const { unmount } = render(
+      <AuthenticatedImage src="/api/gallery/demo/thumbnail/1" alt="t" useCanvasRendering />
+    );
+
+    await waitFor(() => expect(created.length).toBeGreaterThan(0));
+    const img = created[0];
+
+    unmount();
+
+    // The src is dropped so the browser can reclaim the decode without
+    // waiting for GC, and the handlers are detached.
+    expect(img.getAttribute('src')).toBeNull();
+    expect(img.onload).toBeNull();
+    expect(img.onerror).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('revokes the blob URL on unmount', async () => {
+    const { unmount } = render(
+      <AuthenticatedImage src="/api/gallery/demo/thumbnail/1" alt="t" useCanvasRendering />
+    );
+
+    await waitFor(() => expect(created.length).toBeGreaterThan(0));
+    unmount();
+
+    expect(revokeObjectURL).toHaveBeenCalledWith('blob:mock-url-1');
+  });
+
+  it('releases the previous image when the src changes', async () => {
+    // A recycled tile (a layout reusing a component instance for a different
+    // photo) must not accumulate one pinned decode per photo it has shown.
+    const { rerender } = render(
+      <AuthenticatedImage src="/api/gallery/demo/thumbnail/1" alt="t" useCanvasRendering />
+    );
+    await waitFor(() => expect(created.length).toBe(1));
+    const first = created[0];
+
+    rerender(<AuthenticatedImage src="/api/gallery/demo/thumbnail/2" alt="t" useCanvasRendering />);
+    await waitFor(() => expect(created.length).toBe(2));
+
+    expect(first.getAttribute('src')).toBeNull();
+  });
+});

frontend/src/components/gallery/layouts/GridGalleryLayout.tsx

@@ -83,6 +83,24 @@ const GridPhoto: React.FC<GridPhotoProps> = ({
       onToggleSelect={onToggleSelect}
       className={`photo-card relative group cursor-pointer aspect-square ${animationClass}`}
       lazy
+      /*
+       * Pre-load band (#1287). Grid was the only lazy layout passing no
+       * `inViewRootMargin`, so PhotoCard ran the observer at the
+       * IntersectionObserver default of 0px with threshold 0.1 — a tile could
+       * not begin loading until a tenth of it was already on screen. The
+       * gallery owner's description of the symptom is that exact shape:
+       * spinning the wheel outran loading by ~50 images, then it caught up.
+       *
+       * Viewport-relative rather than a fixed 100px like Justified: a phone
+       * and a 4K desktop scroll past very different amounts of grid per
+       * gesture, and a band tuned to one is wrong for the other.
+       *
+       * `%`, not `vh` — rootMargin only accepts px and percentages, and an
+       * IntersectionObserver constructed with a vh value throws. A percentage
+       * resolves against the root's own box, so 100% is one viewport height
+       * of lead in each direction, which is what vh would have meant.
+       */
+      inViewRootMargin="100% 0px"
       fadeInWhenVisible={animationType === 'fade'}
       skeletonClassName="skeleton aspect-square w-full rounded-lg"
       imageProps={{

frontend/src/components/gallery/layouts/__tests__/gridLazyMargin.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+/**
+ * Grid's lazy-loading pre-load band (#1287).
+ *
+ * Grid was the only layout passing `lazy` without an `inViewRootMargin`, so
+ * PhotoCard ran its observer at the IntersectionObserver default of `0px`
+ * with `threshold: 0.1` — a tile could not begin loading until a tenth of it
+ * was already on screen. The gallery owner described exactly that: spinning
+ * the scroll wheel outran loading by ~50 images before it caught up.
+ *
+ * The unit matters as much as the value. `rootMargin` accepts only px and
+ * percentages; an IntersectionObserver constructed with a `vh` value throws
+ * SyntaxError, which would have broken every Grid gallery outright. Verified
+ * in Chrome:
+ *
+ *   '100% 0px'  → accepted
+ *   '100px 0px' → accepted
+ *   '100vh 0px' → SyntaxError: rootMargin must be specified in pixels or percent
+ *
+ * jsdom has no IntersectionObserver, so this asserts against the source
+ * rather than constructing one.
+ */
+import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
+import { readFileSync } from 'fs';
+import { resolve } from 'path';
+
+const layouts = resolve(__dirname, '..');
+const read = (f: string) => readFileSync(resolve(layouts, f), 'utf8');
+
+/** Only px and % are legal rootMargin units. */
+const LEGAL_ROOT_MARGIN = /^(-?\d+(px|%)|0)(\s+(-?\d+(px|%)|0)){0,3}$/;
+
+describe('grid lazy pre-load band', () => {
+  it('Grid passes an inViewRootMargin', () => {
+    expect(read('GridGalleryLayout.tsx')).toMatch(/inViewRootMargin=/);
+  });
+
+  it('every inViewRootMargin in every layout uses a legal unit', () => {
+    // A vh value throws at IntersectionObserver construction and takes the
+    // whole gallery down with it, so this guards the unit, not just presence.
+    for (const file of ['GridGalleryLayout.tsx', 'JustifiedGalleryLayout.tsx']) {
+      const src = read(file);
+      for (const [, value] of src.matchAll(/inViewRootMargin="([^"]+)"/g)) {
+        expect(value, `${file}: "${value}"`).toMatch(LEGAL_ROOT_MARGIN);
+      }
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('every layout that lazy-renders also declares a pre-load band', () => {
+    // The defect was Grid being lazy with no margin. Any future layout that
+    // opts into `lazy` and forgets the margin reintroduces it.
+    for (const file of ['GridGalleryLayout.tsx', 'JustifiedGalleryLayout.tsx']) {
+      const src = read(file);
+      const isLazy = /^\s*lazy\s*$/m.test(src) || /\slazy=\{?true/.test(src);
+      if (!isLazy) continue;
+      expect(src, `${file} is lazy but declares no inViewRootMargin`)
+        .toMatch(/inViewRootMargin=/);
+    }
+  });
+});