Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into codex/1110-usage-coverage

backend/__tests__/integration/imageSecurityDefaults.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,220 @@
+/**
+ * Image-security settings applied as creation defaults (#1296).
+ *
+ * Four controls in Settings → Image security were written, reloaded and
+ * rendered as toggles, and read by nothing:
+ *
+ *   default_protection_level, default_image_quality,
+ *   enable_canvas_rendering
+ *
+ * Each maps onto an `events` column migration 038 already created, and each
+ * is labelled "… by default". `enable_devtools_protection` was the only one
+ * of the five ever wired.
+ *
+ * The load-bearing constraint is that this is CREATION-time only. Applying
+ * these to existing events would silently change live galleries on upgrade —
+ * an install with enable_canvas_rendering already on would flip every grid to
+ * canvas rendering, which is the memory profile under investigation in #1287.
+ */
+
+const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
+
+describe('image-security creation defaults', () => {
+  let db;
+  let cleanup;
+  let getImageSecurityDefaults;
+  let resolveImageSecurityColumns;
+  let readBooleanSetting;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    ({ getImageSecurityDefaults, resolveImageSecurityColumns, readBooleanSetting } =
+      require('../../src/routes/adminEvents/helpers'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    if (cleanup) await cleanup();
+  });
+
+  const setSetting = async (key, value) => {
+    await db('app_settings')
+      .insert({ setting_key: key, setting_value: JSON.stringify(value), setting_type: 'security' })
+      .onConflict('setting_key')
+      .merge();
+  };
+
+  beforeEach(async () => {
+    await db('app_settings').whereIn('setting_key', [
+      'default_protection_level', 'default_image_quality',
+      'enable_canvas_rendering',
+    ]).del();
+  });
+
+  it('returns nothing when no settings are configured', async () => {
+    // Every key absent must fall through to the column defaults, which is
+    // exactly the behaviour before this existed.
+    expect(await getImageSecurityDefaults()).toEqual({});
+  });
+
+  it('maps each setting onto its events column', async () => {
+    await setSetting('default_protection_level', 'enhanced');
+    await setSetting('default_image_quality', 72);
+    await setSetting('enable_canvas_rendering', true);
+
+    expect(await getImageSecurityDefaults()).toEqual({
+      protection_level: 'enhanced',
+      image_quality: 72,
+      use_canvas_rendering: true,
+    });
+  });
+
+  it('carries a false canvas setting through, rather than dropping it', async () => {
+    // `false` is a real choice — dropping it as falsy would leave the column
+    // default in place and make "off" unreachable.
+    await setSetting('enable_canvas_rendering', false);
+    expect(await getImageSecurityDefaults()).toEqual({ use_canvas_rendering: false });
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    ['an unknown protection level', 'default_protection_level', 'paranoid'],
+    ['a non-enum protection level', 'default_protection_level', 42],
+    ['image quality above 100', 'default_image_quality', 250],
+    ['image quality of zero', 'default_image_quality', 0],
+    ['a non-numeric quality', 'default_image_quality', 'high'],
+    ['a non-boolean canvas value', 'enable_canvas_rendering', 'yes'],
+    // parseInt would have rescued each of these into a valid-looking
+    // integer. The settings PUT stores values without validating them, so
+    // they can genuinely be in the table.
+    ['a numeric prefix with trailing junk', 'default_image_quality', '72oops'],
+    ['a fractional quality', 'default_image_quality', 72.5],
+    ['a single-element array', 'default_image_quality', [72]],
+  ])('ignores %s and falls through to the column default', async (_label, key, value) => {
+    await setSetting(key, value);
+    expect(await getImageSecurityDefaults()).toEqual({});
+  });
+
+  it('applies only the keys that are configured', async () => {
+    await setSetting('default_protection_level', 'maximum');
+    expect(await getImageSecurityDefaults()).toEqual({ protection_level: 'maximum' });
+  });
+
+  it('never throws, so a settings failure cannot block event creation', async () => {
+    await setSetting('default_image_quality', { nonsense: true });
+    await expect(getImageSecurityDefaults()).resolves.toEqual({});
+  });
+
+  describe('double-encoded settings (the settings tab round trip)', () => {
+    // GET returns setting_value undecoded and the tab PUTs the whole object
+    // back through JSON.stringify, so on SQLite one visit to the tab turns
+    // every value it read into a doubly-encoded string. A single parse left
+    // a string behind, the type checks rejected it, and the defaults went
+    // silently dead again.
+    const setRaw = async (key, raw) => {
+      await db('app_settings')
+        .insert({ setting_key: key, setting_value: raw, setting_type: 'security' })
+        .onConflict('setting_key').merge();
+    };
+
+    it('reads a double-encoded boolean', async () => {
+      await setRaw('enable_canvas_rendering', JSON.stringify(JSON.stringify(true)));
+      expect(await getImageSecurityDefaults()).toEqual({ use_canvas_rendering: true });
+    });
+
+    it('reads a double-encoded protection level', async () => {
+      await setRaw('default_protection_level', JSON.stringify(JSON.stringify('enhanced')));
+      expect(await getImageSecurityDefaults()).toEqual({ protection_level: 'enhanced' });
+    });
+
+    it('reads a double-encoded integer', async () => {
+      await setRaw('default_image_quality', JSON.stringify(JSON.stringify(72)));
+      expect(await getImageSecurityDefaults()).toEqual({ image_quality: 72 });
+    });
+
+    it('reads a value buried under many saves, not just one', async () => {
+      // Each visit to the settings tab used to add a layer, so the depth is
+      // however many times someone opened it — not a number to cap.
+      let raw = JSON.stringify('maximum');
+      for (let i = 0; i < 8; i += 1) raw = JSON.stringify(raw);
+      await setRaw('default_protection_level', raw);
+      expect(await getImageSecurityDefaults()).toEqual({ protection_level: 'maximum' });
+    });
+
+    it('still rejects a malformed value however many times it was encoded', async () => {
+      await setRaw('default_image_quality', JSON.stringify(JSON.stringify('72oops')));
+      expect(await getImageSecurityDefaults()).toEqual({});
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('readBooleanSetting shares the same decoder', () => {
+    // Every reader of app_settings has to agree, or the settings tab shows
+    // protection disabled while newly created galleries turn it on.
+    const setRaw2 = async (key, raw) => {
+      await db('app_settings')
+        .insert({ setting_key: key, setting_value: raw, setting_type: 'security' })
+        .onConflict('setting_key').merge();
+    };
+
+    it('reads a double-encoded false as false, not as absent', async () => {
+      await setRaw2('enable_devtools_protection', JSON.stringify(JSON.stringify(false)));
+      expect(await readBooleanSetting('enable_devtools_protection')).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    it('still reads a singly-encoded value', async () => {
+      await setRaw2('enable_devtools_protection', JSON.stringify(true));
+      expect(await readBooleanSetting('enable_devtools_protection')).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('returns undefined for a non-boolean, so the caller keeps its default', async () => {
+      await setRaw2('enable_devtools_protection', JSON.stringify('sometimes'));
+      expect(await readBooleanSetting('enable_devtools_protection')).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('resolveImageSecurityColumns', () => {
+    it('omits every column when neither the request nor the settings supply one', () => {
+      expect(resolveImageSecurityColumns({}, {})).toEqual({});
+    });
+
+    it('uses the global default when the request says nothing', () => {
+      expect(resolveImageSecurityColumns({}, { protection_level: 'maximum' }))
+        .toEqual({ protection_level: 'maximum' });
+    });
+
+    it('lets an explicit request value win over the global default', () => {
+      expect(resolveImageSecurityColumns(
+        { protection_level: 'basic' },
+        { protection_level: 'maximum' },
+      )).toEqual({ protection_level: 'basic' });
+    });
+
+    it('keeps an explicit false canvas value instead of reading it as absent', () => {
+      const columns = resolveImageSecurityColumns(
+        { use_canvas_rendering: false },
+        { use_canvas_rendering: true },
+      );
+      expect(columns.use_canvas_rendering).toBeFalsy();
+    });
+
+    it('keeps a zero-ish explicit value rather than falling through', () => {
+      // 0 is out of range for the column, but the guard is `!== undefined`,
+      // not truthiness — the validator is what rejects out-of-range input.
+      expect(resolveImageSecurityColumns({ image_quality: 0 }, { image_quality: 85 }))
+        .toEqual({ image_quality: 0 });
+    });
+
+    it('resolves each column independently', () => {
+      expect(resolveImageSecurityColumns(
+        { image_quality: 60 },
+        { protection_level: 'enhanced' },
+      )).toEqual({
+        protection_level: 'enhanced',
+        image_quality: 60,
+      });
+    });
+
+    it('tolerates a missing body, which is what an empty API request looks like', () => {
+      expect(resolveImageSecurityColumns(undefined, { image_quality: 90 }))
+        .toEqual({ image_quality: 90 });
+    });
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/adminEvents.smoke.test.js

@@ -214,6 +214,43 @@ describe('admin events CRUD endpoints (smoke)', () => {
       expect(row.welcome_message).toBe('Hello guests');
     });
 
+    // #1296 — express-validator runs isInt/isIn/isBoolean element-wise on
+    // arrays, so a single-element array satisfies its field validator and
+    // survives into `updates`, which is spread into .update() with no column
+    // allow-list. That put an array into a scalar column (a PG insert error),
+    // and formatBoolean([false]) read as true. Guarded for every field, not
+    // just the ones that prompted it.
+    it.each([
+      ['image_quality', [72]],
+      ['protection_level', ['basic']],
+      ['use_canvas_rendering', [false]],
+      // Not a protection field: the guard is not scoped to that block.
+      ['event_name', ['Arrayed']],
+      ['allow_downloads', [false]],
+    ])('400s on an array value for %s', async (field, value) => {
+      const id = await insertEvent(db, adminId, { event_name: 'Unchanged' });
+      const res = await auth(request(app).put(`/api/admin/events/${id}`))
+        .send({ [field]: value });
+
+      expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+      expect(res.body.error).toMatch(field);
+      // And nothing was written.
+      const row = await db('events').where({ id }).first();
+      expect(row.event_name).toBe('Unchanged');
+    });
+
+    it('still accepts customer_account_ids, the one field that is an array', async () => {
+      const id = await insertEvent(db, adminId, { event_name: 'Keep' });
+      const res = await auth(request(app).put(`/api/admin/events/${id}`)).send({
+        event_name: 'Renamed',
+        customer_account_ids: [],
+      });
+
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      const row = await db('events').where({ id }).first();
+      expect(row.event_name).toBe('Renamed');
+    });
+
     it('404s when updating a missing event', async () => {
       const res = await auth(request(app).put('/api/admin/events/999999')).send({
         event_name: 'Ghost',

backend/__tests__/services/newsletterService.sanitize.test.js

@@ -12,7 +12,9 @@ jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => ({ db: jest.fn(), logActivity: jest.fn(
 
 const {
   sanitizeCampaignBody, sanitizeCampaignCss, MAX_BODY_BYTES,
+  sanitizeInlineStylesAfterSubstitution,
 } = require('../../src/services/newsletterService');
+const { safeTemplateReplace } = require('../../src/services/emailProcessor');
 
 describe('sanitizeCampaignBody', () => {
   it('returns empty string for empty input', () => {
@@ -92,6 +94,35 @@ describe('sanitizeCampaignBody', () => {
     expect(out).not.toContain('http://evil.example');
   });
 
+  it('blocks a tracking url() hidden behind " entities', () => {
+    // sanitize-html writes `"` inside an attribute as `"`, so the CSS
+    // scanner and the recipient's browser disagreed about where strings
+    // start: the browser decodes first and reads the apostrophe as ordinary
+    // text inside a real string, then fetches the background — while the
+    // scanner saw the apostrophe open a string and skipped past the url().
+    const out = sanitizeCampaignBody(
+      `<p style="font-family:&quot;don't&quot;;background:url(https://evil.example/p.gif)">hi</p>`
+    );
+    expect(out).not.toContain('evil.example');
+  });
+
+  it('blocks a tracking url() hidden behind an escaped quote', () => {
+    const out = sanitizeCampaignBody(
+      `<p style="--m:\\';background:url(https://evil.example/p.gif)">hi</p>`
+    );
+    expect(out).not.toContain('evil.example');
+  });
+
+  it('keeps a legitimate quoted font stack, re-encoded for the attribute', () => {
+    const out = sanitizeCampaignBody(
+      `<p style="color:red;font-family:&quot;Helvetica Neue&quot;,sans-serif">hi</p>`
+    );
+    expect(out).toContain('color:red');
+    expect(out).toContain('Helvetica Neue');
+    // Re-encoded, so the attribute stays well formed rather than being cut short.
+    expect(out).not.toMatch(/style="[^"]*"[^>]*"/);
+  });
+
   it('strips expression() out of an inline style', () => {
     const out = sanitizeCampaignBody('<p style="width:expression(alert(1))">hi</p>');
     expect(out).not.toContain('expression(');
@@ -159,3 +190,46 @@ describe('sanitizeCampaignCss', () => {
     expect(css).not.toContain('</style>');
   });
 });
+
+describe('inline CSS is re-checked after template substitution', () => {
+  // The stored body is sanitized, but safeTemplateReplace rewrites it
+  // afterwards — so the string that was validated is not the string that is
+  // sent. A conditional inside a style attribute can delete the quoting that
+  // made a url() inert, which no amount of lexer correctness can catch.
+  const payload =
+    `<p style="--x:x{{#if company_name}}'{{/if}};`
+    + `background:url(https://evil.example/p.gif);`
+    + `--y:x{{#if company_name}}'{{/if}}">hi</p>`;
+
+  it('neutralises a url() that substitution would activate', () => {
+    const stored = sanitizeCampaignBody(payload);
+    // Correctly left alone at write time: the url() really is inside a CSS
+    // string while the conditionals are still in place.
+    expect(stored).toContain('evil.example');
+
+    const substituted = safeTemplateReplace(stored, { company_name: '' }, { escapeHtml: true });
+    // Expansion removed the quotes, so without the recheck this ships live.
+    expect(substituted).toMatch(/background:url\(https:\/\/evil\.example/);
+
+    const rendered = sanitizeInlineStylesAfterSubstitution(substituted);
+    expect(rendered).not.toMatch(/url\(\s*['"]?https:\/\/evil\.example/);
+    expect(rendered).toContain('background:none');
+  });
+
+  it('leaves a body without style attributes untouched', () => {
+    const html = '<p>Hello {{first_name}}</p>';
+    expect(sanitizeInlineStylesAfterSubstitution(html)).toBe(html);
+  });
+
+  it('keeps legitimate inline styles through the recheck', () => {
+    const html = '<p style="color:red;font-size:14px">hi</p>';
+    const out = sanitizeInlineStylesAfterSubstitution(html);
+    expect(out).toContain('color:red');
+    expect(out).toContain('font-size:14px');
+  });
+
+  it('is safe on empty and nullish input', () => {
+    expect(sanitizeInlineStylesAfterSubstitution('')).toBe('');
+    expect(sanitizeInlineStylesAfterSubstitution(null)).toBeNull();
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/utils/cssSanitizer.remoteUrls.test.js

@@ -221,6 +221,92 @@ describe('sanitizeCSS', () => {
     expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
   });
 
+  it.each([
+    ['a C0 control character', '\u0001'],
+    ['a NUL byte', '\u0000'],
+    ['a DEL byte', '\u007F'],
+    // Newlines are control characters for this strip, so the bypass did not
+    // need an exotic byte — ordinary-looking wrapped CSS was enough.
+    ['a newline', '\n'],
+  ])('blocks a url() that only becomes one after %s is removed', (_label, ch) => {
+    // Same token-joining hazard as the HTML-comment case above: the control
+    // strip used to run AFTER the URL scan, so `u\u0001rl(...)` was scanned
+    // as clean and then joined into a live remote request, with no warning.
+    const { sanitized, warnings } = sanitizeCSS(
+      `.a{background:u${ch}rl(https://evil.example/p.gif)}`
+    );
+    expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
+    expect(warnings.join(' ')).toContain('external URL');
+  });
+
+  it('blocks a url() hidden behind an escaped quote outside a string', () => {
+    // `\'` is an escaped identifier character, not a string opener. The
+    // scanner used to step onto the apostrophe, enter string mode, and copy
+    // the rest of the stylesheet — url() included — unexamined.
+    const { sanitized } = sanitizeCSS(
+      ".hero{--marker:\\';background:url(https://evil.example/p.gif)}"
+    );
+    expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    ['a leading escape', '.a{background:\\75rl(https://evil.example/p.gif)}'],
+    ['an escape mid-identifier', '.a{background:u\\72l(https://evil.example/p.gif)}'],
+  ])('blocks a url() spelled with %s', (_label, css) => {
+    // `\75` is the CSS escape for `u`, so a browser reads `\75rl(` as
+    // url(). The escape-outside-a-string handling has to run AFTER the
+    // identifier check, or it eats the escape and hides the token.
+    const { sanitized } = sanitizeCSS(css);
+    expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
+  });
+
+  it('blocks a url() the TAG strip would have un-quoted', () => {
+    // `<[^>]*>` deletes the span it matches, and `<">` takes a quote with it.
+    // Running that after the URL scan meant the scanner saw the url() safely
+    // inside a string and this pass then removed the quotes that made it so.
+    // URL validation has to be the last thing that looks at the text.
+    const { sanitized } = sanitizeCSS(
+      '--x:x<">;background:url(https://evil.example/p.gif);--y:x<">'
+    );
+    expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
+  });
+
+  it('does not treat NBSP as CSS whitespace inside url()', () => {
+    // JS `\s` matches U+00A0; CSS whitespace does not. Skipping it let the
+    // scanner read the following quote as a legitimate data: URI and swallow
+    // a remote url() inside the "string", while a browser sees an unquoted
+    // url-token ending at the first `)` and fetches the remote background.
+    const NBSP = '\u00a0';
+    const { sanitized } = sanitizeCSS(
+      `.a{background:url(${NBSP}"data:image/png);background:url(https://evil.example/p.gif);--x:");}`
+    );
+    expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
+  });
+
+  it('still allows ordinary CSS whitespace around a data: URI', () => {
+    const spaced = sanitizeCSS('.a{background:url( "" )}');
+    expect(spaced.sanitized).toContain('data:image/png');
+    const tabbed = sanitizeCSS('.a{background:url(\t"")}');
+    expect(tabbed.sanitized).toContain('data:image/png');
+  });
+
+  it('does not let an unterminated quote hide everything after it', () => {
+    // An unclosed quote is a parse error. Trusting it meant one stray
+    // apostrophe disabled scanning for the remainder of the stylesheet, so
+    // the safe reading is to treat it as an ordinary character and continue.
+    const { sanitized } = sanitizeCSS(
+      "p{font-family:'don't;background:url(https://evil.example/p.gif)}"
+    );
+    expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
+  });
+
+  it('still keeps legitimate quoted values and data: images intact', () => {
+    const font = sanitizeCSS('p{font-family:"Helvetica Neue",sans-serif;color:red}');
+    expect(font.sanitized).toContain('"Helvetica Neue"');
+    const data = sanitizeCSS(".a{background:url('')}");
+    expect(data.sanitized).toContain('data:image/png');
+  });
+
   it('still blocks the other forbidden patterns', () => {
     const { sanitized } = sanitizeCSS(
       '@import url("https://x/e.css"); .a{width:expression(alert(1));behavior:url(e.htc)}'