Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' into codex/1110-usage-coverage

backend/__tests__/integration/imageSecurityDefaults.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,220 @@
+/**
+ * Image-security settings applied as creation defaults (#1296).
+ *
+ * Four controls in Settings → Image security were written, reloaded and
+ * rendered as toggles, and read by nothing:
+ *
+ *   default_protection_level, default_image_quality,
+ *   enable_canvas_rendering
+ *
+ * Each maps onto an `events` column migration 038 already created, and each
+ * is labelled "… by default". `enable_devtools_protection` was the only one
+ * of the five ever wired.
+ *
+ * The load-bearing constraint is that this is CREATION-time only. Applying
+ * these to existing events would silently change live galleries on upgrade —
+ * an install with enable_canvas_rendering already on would flip every grid to
+ * canvas rendering, which is the memory profile under investigation in #1287.
+ */
+
+const { bootCrmDb } = require('./helpers/crmDb');
+
+describe('image-security creation defaults', () => {
+  let db;
+  let cleanup;
+  let getImageSecurityDefaults;
+  let resolveImageSecurityColumns;
+  let readBooleanSetting;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    ({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
+    ({ getImageSecurityDefaults, resolveImageSecurityColumns, readBooleanSetting } =
+      require('../../src/routes/adminEvents/helpers'));
+  }, 120000);
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    if (cleanup) await cleanup();
+  });
+
+  const setSetting = async (key, value) => {
+    await db('app_settings')
+      .insert({ setting_key: key, setting_value: JSON.stringify(value), setting_type: 'security' })
+      .onConflict('setting_key')
+      .merge();
+  };
+
+  beforeEach(async () => {
+    await db('app_settings').whereIn('setting_key', [
+      'default_protection_level', 'default_image_quality',
+      'enable_canvas_rendering',
+    ]).del();
+  });
+
+  it('returns nothing when no settings are configured', async () => {
+    // Every key absent must fall through to the column defaults, which is
+    // exactly the behaviour before this existed.
+    expect(await getImageSecurityDefaults()).toEqual({});
+  });
+
+  it('maps each setting onto its events column', async () => {
+    await setSetting('default_protection_level', 'enhanced');
+    await setSetting('default_image_quality', 72);
+    await setSetting('enable_canvas_rendering', true);
+
+    expect(await getImageSecurityDefaults()).toEqual({
+      protection_level: 'enhanced',
+      image_quality: 72,
+      use_canvas_rendering: true,
+    });
+  });
+
+  it('carries a false canvas setting through, rather than dropping it', async () => {
+    // `false` is a real choice — dropping it as falsy would leave the column
+    // default in place and make "off" unreachable.
+    await setSetting('enable_canvas_rendering', false);
+    expect(await getImageSecurityDefaults()).toEqual({ use_canvas_rendering: false });
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    ['an unknown protection level', 'default_protection_level', 'paranoid'],
+    ['a non-enum protection level', 'default_protection_level', 42],
+    ['image quality above 100', 'default_image_quality', 250],
+    ['image quality of zero', 'default_image_quality', 0],
+    ['a non-numeric quality', 'default_image_quality', 'high'],
+    ['a non-boolean canvas value', 'enable_canvas_rendering', 'yes'],
+    // parseInt would have rescued each of these into a valid-looking
+    // integer. The settings PUT stores values without validating them, so
+    // they can genuinely be in the table.
+    ['a numeric prefix with trailing junk', 'default_image_quality', '72oops'],
+    ['a fractional quality', 'default_image_quality', 72.5],
+    ['a single-element array', 'default_image_quality', [72]],
+  ])('ignores %s and falls through to the column default', async (_label, key, value) => {
+    await setSetting(key, value);
+    expect(await getImageSecurityDefaults()).toEqual({});
+  });
+
+  it('applies only the keys that are configured', async () => {
+    await setSetting('default_protection_level', 'maximum');
+    expect(await getImageSecurityDefaults()).toEqual({ protection_level: 'maximum' });
+  });
+
+  it('never throws, so a settings failure cannot block event creation', async () => {
+    await setSetting('default_image_quality', { nonsense: true });
+    await expect(getImageSecurityDefaults()).resolves.toEqual({});
+  });
+
+  describe('double-encoded settings (the settings tab round trip)', () => {
+    // GET returns setting_value undecoded and the tab PUTs the whole object
+    // back through JSON.stringify, so on SQLite one visit to the tab turns
+    // every value it read into a doubly-encoded string. A single parse left
+    // a string behind, the type checks rejected it, and the defaults went
+    // silently dead again.
+    const setRaw = async (key, raw) => {
+      await db('app_settings')
+        .insert({ setting_key: key, setting_value: raw, setting_type: 'security' })
+        .onConflict('setting_key').merge();
+    };
+
+    it('reads a double-encoded boolean', async () => {
+      await setRaw('enable_canvas_rendering', JSON.stringify(JSON.stringify(true)));
+      expect(await getImageSecurityDefaults()).toEqual({ use_canvas_rendering: true });
+    });
+
+    it('reads a double-encoded protection level', async () => {
+      await setRaw('default_protection_level', JSON.stringify(JSON.stringify('enhanced')));
+      expect(await getImageSecurityDefaults()).toEqual({ protection_level: 'enhanced' });
+    });
+
+    it('reads a double-encoded integer', async () => {
+      await setRaw('default_image_quality', JSON.stringify(JSON.stringify(72)));
+      expect(await getImageSecurityDefaults()).toEqual({ image_quality: 72 });
+    });
+
+    it('reads a value buried under many saves, not just one', async () => {
+      // Each visit to the settings tab used to add a layer, so the depth is
+      // however many times someone opened it — not a number to cap.
+      let raw = JSON.stringify('maximum');
+      for (let i = 0; i < 8; i += 1) raw = JSON.stringify(raw);
+      await setRaw('default_protection_level', raw);
+      expect(await getImageSecurityDefaults()).toEqual({ protection_level: 'maximum' });
+    });
+
+    it('still rejects a malformed value however many times it was encoded', async () => {
+      await setRaw('default_image_quality', JSON.stringify(JSON.stringify('72oops')));
+      expect(await getImageSecurityDefaults()).toEqual({});
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('readBooleanSetting shares the same decoder', () => {
+    // Every reader of app_settings has to agree, or the settings tab shows
+    // protection disabled while newly created galleries turn it on.
+    const setRaw2 = async (key, raw) => {
+      await db('app_settings')
+        .insert({ setting_key: key, setting_value: raw, setting_type: 'security' })
+        .onConflict('setting_key').merge();
+    };
+
+    it('reads a double-encoded false as false, not as absent', async () => {
+      await setRaw2('enable_devtools_protection', JSON.stringify(JSON.stringify(false)));
+      expect(await readBooleanSetting('enable_devtools_protection')).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    it('still reads a singly-encoded value', async () => {
+      await setRaw2('enable_devtools_protection', JSON.stringify(true));
+      expect(await readBooleanSetting('enable_devtools_protection')).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    it('returns undefined for a non-boolean, so the caller keeps its default', async () => {
+      await setRaw2('enable_devtools_protection', JSON.stringify('sometimes'));
+      expect(await readBooleanSetting('enable_devtools_protection')).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe('resolveImageSecurityColumns', () => {
+    it('omits every column when neither the request nor the settings supply one', () => {
+      expect(resolveImageSecurityColumns({}, {})).toEqual({});
+    });
+
+    it('uses the global default when the request says nothing', () => {
+      expect(resolveImageSecurityColumns({}, { protection_level: 'maximum' }))
+        .toEqual({ protection_level: 'maximum' });
+    });
+
+    it('lets an explicit request value win over the global default', () => {
+      expect(resolveImageSecurityColumns(
+        { protection_level: 'basic' },
+        { protection_level: 'maximum' },
+      )).toEqual({ protection_level: 'basic' });
+    });
+
+    it('keeps an explicit false canvas value instead of reading it as absent', () => {
+      const columns = resolveImageSecurityColumns(
+        { use_canvas_rendering: false },
+        { use_canvas_rendering: true },
+      );
+      expect(columns.use_canvas_rendering).toBeFalsy();
+    });
+
+    it('keeps a zero-ish explicit value rather than falling through', () => {
+      // 0 is out of range for the column, but the guard is `!== undefined`,
+      // not truthiness — the validator is what rejects out-of-range input.
+      expect(resolveImageSecurityColumns({ image_quality: 0 }, { image_quality: 85 }))
+        .toEqual({ image_quality: 0 });
+    });
+
+    it('resolves each column independently', () => {
+      expect(resolveImageSecurityColumns(
+        { image_quality: 60 },
+        { protection_level: 'enhanced' },
+      )).toEqual({
+        protection_level: 'enhanced',
+        image_quality: 60,
+      });
+    });
+
+    it('tolerates a missing body, which is what an empty API request looks like', () => {
+      expect(resolveImageSecurityColumns(undefined, { image_quality: 90 }))
+        .toEqual({ image_quality: 90 });
+    });
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/routes/adminEvents.smoke.test.js

@@ -214,6 +214,43 @@ describe('admin events CRUD endpoints (smoke)', () => {
       expect(row.welcome_message).toBe('Hello guests');
     });
 
+    // #1296 — express-validator runs isInt/isIn/isBoolean element-wise on
+    // arrays, so a single-element array satisfies its field validator and
+    // survives into `updates`, which is spread into .update() with no column
+    // allow-list. That put an array into a scalar column (a PG insert error),
+    // and formatBoolean([false]) read as true. Guarded for every field, not
+    // just the ones that prompted it.
+    it.each([
+      ['image_quality', [72]],
+      ['protection_level', ['basic']],
+      ['use_canvas_rendering', [false]],
+      // Not a protection field: the guard is not scoped to that block.
+      ['event_name', ['Arrayed']],
+      ['allow_downloads', [false]],
+    ])('400s on an array value for %s', async (field, value) => {
+      const id = await insertEvent(db, adminId, { event_name: 'Unchanged' });
+      const res = await auth(request(app).put(`/api/admin/events/${id}`))
+        .send({ [field]: value });
+
+      expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+      expect(res.body.error).toMatch(field);
+      // And nothing was written.
+      const row = await db('events').where({ id }).first();
+      expect(row.event_name).toBe('Unchanged');
+    });
+
+    it('still accepts customer_account_ids, the one field that is an array', async () => {
+      const id = await insertEvent(db, adminId, { event_name: 'Keep' });
+      const res = await auth(request(app).put(`/api/admin/events/${id}`)).send({
+        event_name: 'Renamed',
+        customer_account_ids: [],
+      });
+
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      const row = await db('events').where({ id }).first();
+      expect(row.event_name).toBe('Renamed');
+    });
+
     it('404s when updating a missing event', async () => {
       const res = await auth(request(app).put('/api/admin/events/999999')).send({
         event_name: 'Ghost',

backend/__tests__/services/newsletterService.sanitize.test.js

@@ -12,7 +12,9 @@ jest.mock('../../src/database/db', () => ({ db: jest.fn(), logActivity: jest.fn(
 
 const {
   sanitizeCampaignBody, sanitizeCampaignCss, MAX_BODY_BYTES,
+  sanitizeInlineStylesAfterSubstitution,
 } = require('../../src/services/newsletterService');
+const { safeTemplateReplace } = require('../../src/services/emailProcessor');
 
 describe('sanitizeCampaignBody', () => {
   it('returns empty string for empty input', () => {
@@ -92,6 +94,35 @@ describe('sanitizeCampaignBody', () => {
     expect(out).not.toContain('http://evil.example');
   });
 
+  it('blocks a tracking url() hidden behind " entities', () => {
+    // sanitize-html writes `"` inside an attribute as `"`, so the CSS
+    // scanner and the recipient's browser disagreed about where strings
+    // start: the browser decodes first and reads the apostrophe as ordinary
+    // text inside a real string, then fetches the background — while the
+    // scanner saw the apostrophe open a string and skipped past the url().
+    const out = sanitizeCampaignBody(
+      `<p style="font-family:&quot;don't&quot;;background:url(https://evil.example/p.gif)">hi</p>`
+    );
+    expect(out).not.toContain('evil.example');
+  });
+
+  it('blocks a tracking url() hidden behind an escaped quote', () => {
+    const out = sanitizeCampaignBody(
+      `<p style="--m:\\';background:url(https://evil.example/p.gif)">hi</p>`
+    );
+    expect(out).not.toContain('evil.example');
+  });
+
+  it('keeps a legitimate quoted font stack, re-encoded for the attribute', () => {
+    const out = sanitizeCampaignBody(
+      `<p style="color:red;font-family:&quot;Helvetica Neue&quot;,sans-serif">hi</p>`
+    );
+    expect(out).toContain('color:red');
+    expect(out).toContain('Helvetica Neue');
+    // Re-encoded, so the attribute stays well formed rather than being cut short.
+    expect(out).not.toMatch(/style="[^"]*"[^>]*"/);
+  });
+
   it('strips expression() out of an inline style', () => {
     const out = sanitizeCampaignBody('<p style="width:expression(alert(1))">hi</p>');
     expect(out).not.toContain('expression(');
@@ -159,3 +190,46 @@ describe('sanitizeCampaignCss', () => {
     expect(css).not.toContain('</style>');
   });
 });
+
+describe('inline CSS is re-checked after template substitution', () => {
+  // The stored body is sanitized, but safeTemplateReplace rewrites it
+  // afterwards — so the string that was validated is not the string that is
+  // sent. A conditional inside a style attribute can delete the quoting that
+  // made a url() inert, which no amount of lexer correctness can catch.
+  const payload =
+    `<p style="--x:x{{#if company_name}}'{{/if}};`
+    + `background:url(https://evil.example/p.gif);`
+    + `--y:x{{#if company_name}}'{{/if}}">hi</p>`;
+
+  it('neutralises a url() that substitution would activate', () => {
+    const stored = sanitizeCampaignBody(payload);
+    // Correctly left alone at write time: the url() really is inside a CSS
+    // string while the conditionals are still in place.
+    expect(stored).toContain('evil.example');
+
+    const substituted = safeTemplateReplace(stored, { company_name: '' }, { escapeHtml: true });
+    // Expansion removed the quotes, so without the recheck this ships live.
+    expect(substituted).toMatch(/background:url\(https:\/\/evil\.example/);
+
+    const rendered = sanitizeInlineStylesAfterSubstitution(substituted);
+    expect(rendered).not.toMatch(/url\(\s*['"]?https:\/\/evil\.example/);
+    expect(rendered).toContain('background:none');
+  });
+
+  it('leaves a body without style attributes untouched', () => {
+    const html = '<p>Hello {{first_name}}</p>';
+    expect(sanitizeInlineStylesAfterSubstitution(html)).toBe(html);
+  });
+
+  it('keeps legitimate inline styles through the recheck', () => {
+    const html = '<p style="color:red;font-size:14px">hi</p>';
+    const out = sanitizeInlineStylesAfterSubstitution(html);
+    expect(out).toContain('color:red');
+    expect(out).toContain('font-size:14px');
+  });
+
+  it('is safe on empty and nullish input', () => {
+    expect(sanitizeInlineStylesAfterSubstitution('')).toBe('');
+    expect(sanitizeInlineStylesAfterSubstitution(null)).toBeNull();
+  });
+});

backend/__tests__/utils/cssSanitizer.remoteUrls.test.js

@@ -221,6 +221,92 @@ describe('sanitizeCSS', () => {
     expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
   });
 
+  it.each([
+    ['a C0 control character', '\u0001'],
+    ['a NUL byte', '\u0000'],
+    ['a DEL byte', '\u007F'],
+    // Newlines are control characters for this strip, so the bypass did not
+    // need an exotic byte — ordinary-looking wrapped CSS was enough.
+    ['a newline', '\n'],
+  ])('blocks a url() that only becomes one after %s is removed', (_label, ch) => {
+    // Same token-joining hazard as the HTML-comment case above: the control
+    // strip used to run AFTER the URL scan, so `u\u0001rl(...)` was scanned
+    // as clean and then joined into a live remote request, with no warning.
+    const { sanitized, warnings } = sanitizeCSS(
+      `.a{background:u${ch}rl(https://evil.example/p.gif)}`
+    );
+    expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
+    expect(warnings.join(' ')).toContain('external URL');
+  });
+
+  it('blocks a url() hidden behind an escaped quote outside a string', () => {
+    // `\'` is an escaped identifier character, not a string opener. The
+    // scanner used to step onto the apostrophe, enter string mode, and copy
+    // the rest of the stylesheet — url() included — unexamined.
+    const { sanitized } = sanitizeCSS(
+      ".hero{--marker:\\';background:url(https://evil.example/p.gif)}"
+    );
+    expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    ['a leading escape', '.a{background:\\75rl(https://evil.example/p.gif)}'],
+    ['an escape mid-identifier', '.a{background:u\\72l(https://evil.example/p.gif)}'],
+  ])('blocks a url() spelled with %s', (_label, css) => {
+    // `\75` is the CSS escape for `u`, so a browser reads `\75rl(` as
+    // url(). The escape-outside-a-string handling has to run AFTER the
+    // identifier check, or it eats the escape and hides the token.
+    const { sanitized } = sanitizeCSS(css);
+    expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
+  });
+
+  it('blocks a url() the TAG strip would have un-quoted', () => {
+    // `<[^>]*>` deletes the span it matches, and `<">` takes a quote with it.
+    // Running that after the URL scan meant the scanner saw the url() safely
+    // inside a string and this pass then removed the quotes that made it so.
+    // URL validation has to be the last thing that looks at the text.
+    const { sanitized } = sanitizeCSS(
+      '--x:x<">;background:url(https://evil.example/p.gif);--y:x<">'
+    );
+    expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
+  });
+
+  it('does not treat NBSP as CSS whitespace inside url()', () => {
+    // JS `\s` matches U+00A0; CSS whitespace does not. Skipping it let the
+    // scanner read the following quote as a legitimate data: URI and swallow
+    // a remote url() inside the "string", while a browser sees an unquoted
+    // url-token ending at the first `)` and fetches the remote background.
+    const NBSP = '\u00a0';
+    const { sanitized } = sanitizeCSS(
+      `.a{background:url(${NBSP}"data:image/png);background:url(https://evil.example/p.gif);--x:");}`
+    );
+    expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
+  });
+
+  it('still allows ordinary CSS whitespace around a data: URI', () => {
+    const spaced = sanitizeCSS('.a{background:url( "" )}');
+    expect(spaced.sanitized).toContain('data:image/png');
+    const tabbed = sanitizeCSS('.a{background:url(\t"")}');
+    expect(tabbed.sanitized).toContain('data:image/png');
+  });
+
+  it('does not let an unterminated quote hide everything after it', () => {
+    // An unclosed quote is a parse error. Trusting it meant one stray
+    // apostrophe disabled scanning for the remainder of the stylesheet, so
+    // the safe reading is to treat it as an ordinary character and continue.
+    const { sanitized } = sanitizeCSS(
+      "p{font-family:'don't;background:url(https://evil.example/p.gif)}"
+    );
+    expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
+  });
+
+  it('still keeps legitimate quoted values and data: images intact', () => {
+    const font = sanitizeCSS('p{font-family:"Helvetica Neue",sans-serif;color:red}');
+    expect(font.sanitized).toContain('"Helvetica Neue"');
+    const data = sanitizeCSS(".a{background:url('')}");
+    expect(data.sanitized).toContain('data:image/png');
+  });
+
   it('still blocks the other forbidden patterns', () => {
     const { sanitized } = sanitizeCSS(
       '@import url("https://x/e.css"); .a{width:expression(alert(1));behavior:url(e.htc)}'

backend/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "picpeak-backend",
-  "version": "3.123.0-beta.0",
+  "version": "3.124.1-beta.0",
   "description": "Backend for PicPeak event photo sharing platform",
   "main": "server.js",
   "engines": {

backend/src/routes/adminEvents/crud.js

@@ -30,7 +30,8 @@ const { clampIntOrUndefined } = require('../../utils/numericHelpers');
 const { getFrontendBaseUrl, getAbsoluteFrontendUrl } = require('../../utils/frontendUrl');
 const downloadZipService = require('../../services/downloadZipService');
 const { resolveEventFeedbackDefaults, applyFeedbackDefaults, KEYBIND_MODES } = require('../../services/feedbackDefaults');
-const { validateHeroImageAnchor, getEventFieldRequirements, readBooleanSetting, getDownloadProtectionDefaults, getBrandingDefaults, getCustomerNameFromPayload, getCustomerEmailFromPayload, getCustomerPhoneFromPayload, isPhoneFieldEnabled, mapEventForApi, hasCustomerContactColumns, deleteEventCascade, SLIDESHOW_TRANSITIONS, SLIDESHOW_COLORFILTERS } = require('./helpers');
+const { validateHeroImageAnchor, getEventFieldRequirements, readBooleanSetting, getDownloadProtectionDefaults,
+  getImageSecurityDefaults, resolveImageSecurityColumns, getBrandingDefaults, getCustomerNameFromPayload, getCustomerEmailFromPayload, getCustomerPhoneFromPayload, isPhoneFieldEnabled, mapEventForApi, hasCustomerContactColumns, deleteEventCascade, SLIDESHOW_TRANSITIONS, SLIDESHOW_COLORFILTERS } = require('./helpers');
 
 /**
  * `events.slug` is UNIQUE, and both routes that mint one do a read-then-insert
@@ -228,6 +229,12 @@ module.exports = (router) => {
     body('allow_downloads').optional().isBoolean(),
     body('disable_right_click').optional().isBoolean(),
     body('enable_devtools_protection').optional().isBoolean(),
+    // Image security. PUT /:id has validated these all along; create
+    // accepted none of them, so a value sent here used to be dropped on the
+    // floor and the column default applied instead (#1296).
+    body('protection_level').optional().not().isArray().isIn(['basic', 'standard', 'enhanced', 'maximum']),
+    body('use_canvas_rendering').optional().not().isArray().isBoolean().toBoolean(),
+    body('image_quality').optional().not().isArray().isInt({ min: 1, max: 100 }).toInt(),
     body('watermark_downloads').optional().isBoolean(),
     body('watermark_text').optional().trim(),
     // #328 follow-up: per-event opt-in for presigned-URL "Download All".
@@ -544,6 +551,14 @@ module.exports = (router) => {
       // the request explicitly overrides it (#317 — admin disabled it globally
       // but new events still got it ON because the column default is true).
       const protectionDefaults = await getDownloadProtectionDefaults();
+      // #1296 — the other four Image-security settings, which were written,
+      // rendered as controls, and read by nothing. Same inheritance rule as
+      // the devtools setting below. Creation-time only; see
+      // getImageSecurityDefaults for why existing events are left alone.
+      const imageSecurityColumns = resolveImageSecurityColumns(
+        req.body,
+        await getImageSecurityDefaults(),
+      );
       const effectiveEnableDevtoolsProtection =
       enableDevtoolsProtectionInput !== undefined
         ? enableDevtoolsProtectionInput
@@ -617,6 +632,9 @@ module.exports = (router) => {
         allow_downloads: formatBoolean(allow_downloads !== undefined ? allow_downloads : true),
         disable_right_click: formatBoolean(disable_right_click !== undefined ? disable_right_click : false),
         enable_devtools_protection: formatBoolean(effectiveEnableDevtoolsProtection),
+        // Request value, else the global default, else the column default —
+        // a key absent here is one the database fills in (#1296).
+        ...imageSecurityColumns,
         watermark_downloads: formatBoolean(watermark_downloads !== undefined ? watermark_downloads : false),
         watermark_text,
         allow_presigned_download: formatBoolean(allow_presigned_download === true || allow_presigned_download === 'true'),
@@ -1400,6 +1418,14 @@ module.exports = (router) => {
         allow_downloads: source.allow_downloads,
         disable_right_click: source.disable_right_click,
         enable_devtools_protection: source.enable_devtools_protection,
+        // A duplicate inherits the source's protection settings, NOT the
+        // current global defaults — copying the gallery is the whole point.
+        // These four sat next to enable_devtools_protection and were simply
+        // missed, so duplicating a 'maximum' event produced a 'standard' one
+        // (#1296).
+        protection_level: source.protection_level,
+        image_quality: source.image_quality,
+        use_canvas_rendering: source.use_canvas_rendering,
         watermark_downloads: source.watermark_downloads,
         watermark_text: source.watermark_text,
         allow_presigned_download: source.allow_presigned_download,
@@ -1569,7 +1595,6 @@ module.exports = (router) => {
     body('use_canvas_rendering').optional().isBoolean(),
     body('overlay_protection').optional().isBoolean(),
     body('image_quality').optional().isInt({ min: 1, max: 100 }),
-    body('fragmentation_level').optional().isInt({ min: 1, max: 10 }),
     body('password').optional().isString().custom((value) => {
       if (value === undefined || value === null || value === '') {
         return true;
@@ -1630,6 +1655,25 @@ module.exports = (router) => {
       const { id } = req.params;
       const updates = { ...req.body };
 
+      // express-validator applies isInt/isIn/isBoolean element-wise to
+      // arrays, so `image_quality: [72]` satisfies its validator and stays
+      // an array. This handler spreads req.body into .update() with no
+      // column allow-list, so such a value reaches a scalar column: a PG
+      // insert error, and `[false]` coerced to true by formatBoolean.
+      //
+      // Guarded here rather than per field because it applies to all 44
+      // validated fields, not to a chosen few. `customer_account_ids` is the
+      // only field that is legitimately an array, and it is deleted from
+      // `updates` below before the write (#1296).
+      const ARRAY_VALUED_FIELDS = new Set(['customer_account_ids']);
+      const arrayValued = Object.keys(updates)
+        .filter((key) => Array.isArray(updates[key]) && !ARRAY_VALUED_FIELDS.has(key));
+      if (arrayValued.length > 0) {
+        return res.status(400).json({
+          error: `Array values are not accepted for: ${arrayValued.join(', ')}`,
+        });
+      }
+
       // Strip identity/provenance/secret columns from the mass-assigned
       // body (GHSA-3rqx). The handler spreads req.body straight into the
       // events UPDATE, so without this an events.edit holder could rewrite

backend/src/routes/adminEvents/helpers.js

@@ -73,14 +73,37 @@ const getEventFieldRequirements = async () => {
 // Helper to read app_settings booleans by key, used to inherit per-setting
 // defaults onto new events. Returns `undefined` for missing/non-boolean rows
 // so callers can fall back to a legacy default.
+/**
+ * Decode an app_settings value into the JS value it represents.
+ *
+ * setting_value is JSON text on SQLite and may already be decoded by the
+ * driver on a PG json column, so one parse does not normalise both. On top
+ * of that, the Image Security tab used to PUT back values it had read
+ * undecoded, wrapping another layer of quoting around each one on every
+ * save — the GET handler decodes now, but installs carry however many
+ * layers they accumulated before that.
+ *
+ * Every reader of app_settings has to agree about this, or the admin UI
+ * shows one thing while event creation does another.
+ *
+ * Terminates: each parse of a string is strictly shorter than its input.
+ */
+const decodeSettingValue = (raw) => {
+  let value = raw;
+  while (typeof value === 'string') {
+    let parsed;
+    try { parsed = JSON.parse(value); } catch { break; }
+    if (parsed === value) break;
+    value = parsed;
+  }
+  return value;
+};
+
 const readBooleanSetting = async (key) => {
   try {
     const setting = await db('app_settings').where('setting_key', key).first();
     if (!setting) return undefined;
-    let value = setting.setting_value;
-    if (typeof value === 'string') {
-      try { value = JSON.parse(value); } catch { /* keep raw */ }
-    }
+    const value = decodeSettingValue(setting.setting_value);
     return typeof value === 'boolean' ? value : undefined;
   } catch (error) {
     logger.error('Failed to read app setting', { key, error: error.message });
@@ -95,6 +118,148 @@ const getDownloadProtectionDefaults = async () => {
   return { enable_devtools_protection: await readBooleanSetting('enable_devtools_protection') };
 };
 
+/**
+ * The rest of Settings → Image security, as creation defaults (#1296).
+ *
+ * Four settings in that panel were written, reloaded and rendered as
+ * controls, and read by nothing:
+ *
+ *   default_protection_level     → events.protection_level
+ *   default_image_quality        → events.image_quality
+ *   enable_canvas_rendering      → events.use_canvas_rendering
+ *
+ * Each maps onto a column migration 038 already created, and each is
+ * labelled "… by default", so applying them at creation is what the panel
+ * has always claimed to do. `enable_devtools_protection` above is the only
+ * one of the five that was ever wired.
+ *
+ * Creation-time only, deliberately. Applying them to EXISTING events would
+ * silently change live galleries on upgrade — an install with
+ * enable_canvas_rendering already on would switch every grid to canvas
+ * rendering, which is memory-expensive at scale and is the profile under
+ * investigation in #1287. New events only; existing rows untouched.
+ *
+ * Any value that is missing or malformed comes back undefined so the caller
+ * falls through to the column default, exactly as before this existed.
+ */
+const PROTECTION_LEVELS = ['basic', 'standard', 'enhanced', 'maximum'];
+
+// parseInt would rescue malformed settings instead of rejecting them:
+// parseInt('72oops') is 72, parseInt(72.5) is 72, parseInt([72]) is 72.
+// That matters because the settings PUT stores whatever JSON it is handed
+// without validating the value (adminImageSecurity.js writes
+// JSON.stringify(value) for any allow-listed key), so those shapes really
+// can be sitting in app_settings. Accept only a genuine integer, or a
+// string that is exactly one.
+const toInteger = (value) => {
+  if (typeof value === 'number') return Number.isInteger(value) ? value : undefined;
+  if (typeof value === 'string' && /^[+-]?\d+$/.test(value.trim())) return Number(value.trim());
+  return undefined;
+};
+
+const getImageSecurityDefaults = async (trx = null) => {
+  const defaults = {};
+  try {
+    // Accepts a transaction the way getAppSetting does. It matters on
+    // sqlite3, whose pool holds a single connection: a caller already inside
+    // db.transaction() that read through the global `db` would block on the
+    // connection its own transaction holds until the acquire timeout, and
+    // the catch below would then quietly swallow it and drop the defaults.
+    const query = trx || db;
+    const rows = await query('app_settings')
+      .whereIn('setting_key', [
+        'default_protection_level',
+        'default_image_quality',
+        'enable_canvas_rendering',
+      ])
+      .select('setting_key', 'setting_value');
+
+    // app_settings holds JSON text on SQLite, while a PG json column comes
+    // back already decoded — so one parse is not enough to normalise both.
+    // Worse, GET /api/admin/image-security/settings returns setting_value
+    // without decoding it and the settings tab PUTs the whole fetched object
+    // straight back through JSON.stringify, so opening the tab and saving
+    // re-encodes every value it read as text. After one such round trip
+    // `true` is stored as "\"true\"" and a single parse yields the string
+    // 'true', which the type checks below reject — the settings would go
+    // quietly dead again, which is the bug this whole change exists to fix.
+    // The GET handler now decodes, so this stops accumulating — but installs
+    // that already stacked N layers have to keep working, and N is however
+    // many times someone opened that tab. So unwrap until it stops being a
+    // JSON string rather than to a fixed depth; this terminates because each
+    // parse of a string is strictly shorter than its input.
+    const read = (key) => {
+      const row = rows.find((r) => r.setting_key === key);
+      if (!row) return undefined;
+      return decodeSettingValue(row.setting_value);
+    };
+
+    const level = read('default_protection_level');
+    if (typeof level === 'string' && PROTECTION_LEVELS.includes(level)) {
+      defaults.protection_level = level;
+    }
+
+    // The column is an integer percentage; anything outside 1..100 is a
+    // misconfiguration and falls through rather than being clamped into
+    // something the operator did not choose.
+    const quality = toInteger(read('default_image_quality'));
+    if (quality !== undefined && quality >= 1 && quality <= 100) {
+      defaults.image_quality = quality;
+    }
+
+    const canvas = read('enable_canvas_rendering');
+    if (typeof canvas === 'boolean') {
+      defaults.use_canvas_rendering = canvas;
+    }
+
+  } catch (error) {
+    // A settings read must never block event creation; the column defaults
+    // are a correct fallback.
+    logger.error('Failed to read image-security defaults', { error: error.message });
+  }
+  return defaults;
+};
+
+/**
+ * Build the image-security columns for a NEW event: an explicit request
+ * value wins, then the global default, then the column default (the key is
+ * omitted entirely so the database supplies it).
+ *
+ * Shared by the admin create route and POST /api/v1/events so the configured
+ * security level cannot depend on which entry point created the gallery —
+ * the same split that made #592 (devtools) a separate bug from #317.
+ *
+ * `body` values are already validated by the route's express-validator
+ * chain; `defaults` come from getImageSecurityDefaults(), which validates
+ * them itself.
+ */
+const resolveImageSecurityColumns = (body = {}, defaults = {}) => {
+  const { formatBoolean } = require('../../utils/dbCompat');
+  const columns = {};
+  // express-validator runs isInt/isIn/isBoolean element-wise on arrays, so a
+  // single-element array like `image_quality: [72]` passes the route's chain
+  // and arrives here still an array. The routes reject those with
+  // .not().isArray(); this guard means any future caller cannot write one
+  // into a scalar column (a PG insert error, or `[false]` coerced to true).
+  const scalar = (v) => (v !== null && typeof v === 'object' ? undefined : v);
+  const pick = (key) => {
+    const fromBody = scalar(body[key]);
+    return fromBody !== undefined ? fromBody : defaults[key];
+  };
+
+  const level = pick('protection_level');
+  if (level !== undefined) columns.protection_level = level;
+
+  const quality = pick('image_quality');
+  if (quality !== undefined) columns.image_quality = quality;
+
+  const canvas = pick('use_canvas_rendering');
+  if (canvas !== undefined) columns.use_canvas_rendering = formatBoolean(canvas);
+
+
+  return columns;
+};
+
 // Helper to get branding defaults for new events (Feature 7: Branding Inheritance).
 //
 // Note: `branding_logo_position` (header bar — left/center/right) is a
@@ -527,7 +692,10 @@ module.exports = {
   getStoragePath,
   getEventFieldRequirements,
   readBooleanSetting,
+  decodeSettingValue,
   getDownloadProtectionDefaults,
+  getImageSecurityDefaults,
+  resolveImageSecurityColumns,
   getBrandingDefaults,
   getCustomerNameFromPayload,
   getCustomerEmailFromPayload,

backend/src/routes/adminImageSecurity.js

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ const { adminAuth } = require('../middleware/auth');
 const { requirePermission } = require('../middleware/permissions');
 const secureImageMiddleware = require('../middleware/secureImageMiddleware');
 const logger = require('../utils/logger');
+const { decodeSettingValue } = require('./adminEvents/helpers');
 
 const router = express.Router();
 
@@ -22,7 +23,6 @@ router.get('/settings', adminAuth, requirePermission(['settings.view', 'image_se
         'max_image_requests_per_hour',
         'suspicious_activity_threshold',
         'enable_canvas_rendering',
-        'default_fragmentation_level',
         'security_monitoring_enabled',
         'block_suspicious_ips',
         'log_security_events_to_db',
@@ -32,9 +32,15 @@ router.get('/settings', adminAuth, requirePermission(['settings.view', 'image_se
 
     const config = {};
     settings.forEach(setting => {
-      // PostgreSQL JSON columns are already parsed by the driver
-      // Just use the value directly - no need to JSON.parse
-      config[setting.setting_key] = setting.setting_value;
+      // setting_value is JSON text on SQLite, and already decoded by the
+      // driver on a PG json column — so returning it raw shipped strings
+      // like "true" to a tab that types the field as boolean. Worse, the
+      // tab PUTs this whole object straight back through JSON.stringify,
+      // so every save wrapped another layer of quoting around values nobody
+      // edited, until consumers could no longer read them (#1296). Decode
+      // here so a round trip is idempotent. This terminates: each parse of
+      // a string is strictly shorter than its input.
+      config[setting.setting_key] = decodeSettingValue(setting.setting_value);
     });
 
     res.json(config);
@@ -61,7 +67,6 @@ router.put('/settings', adminAuth, requirePermission('image_security.manage'), a
       'max_image_requests_per_hour',
       'suspicious_activity_threshold',
       'enable_canvas_rendering',
-      'default_fragmentation_level',
       'security_monitoring_enabled',
       'block_suspicious_ips',
       'log_security_events_to_db',

backend/src/routes/gallery.js

@@ -1227,7 +1227,6 @@ router.get('/:slug/photos', verifyGalleryAccess, resolveGuest, noStoreCache, asy
       protection_level: req.event.protection_level || 'standard',
       image_quality: req.event.image_quality || 85,
       use_canvas_rendering: parseBooleanInput(req.event.use_canvas_rendering, false),
-      fragmentation_level: req.event.fragmentation_level || 3,
       overlay_protection: parseBooleanInput(req.event.overlay_protection, true)
     };
 

backend/src/routes/protectedImages.js

@@ -117,8 +117,7 @@ router.get('/:slug/photo/:photoId/view', verifyGalleryAccess, blockHiddenGallery
     const protectionSettings = {
       protectionLevel: eventProtectionLevel,
       quality: req.event.image_quality || 85,
-      addFingerprint: req.event.add_fingerprint !== false,
-      fragmentImage: eventProtectionLevel === 'maximum'
+      addFingerprint: req.event.add_fingerprint !== false
     };
 
     // Resolve photo location through the storage backend (managed) or local
@@ -151,21 +150,6 @@ router.get('/:slug/photo/:photoId/view', verifyGalleryAccess, blockHiddenGallery
         ? await withLocalCopy(storageKey, runProcessing)
         : await runProcessing(resolvePhotoFilePath(req.event, photo));
 
-      if (processedImage.type === 'fragmented') {
-        return res.json({
-          type: 'fragmented',
-          fragments: processedImage.fragments.map(f => ({
-            index: f.index,
-            row: f.row,
-            col: f.col,
-            data: f.buffer.toString('base64'),
-            position: f.position
-          })),
-          dimensions: processedImage.originalDimensions,
-          fragmentDimensions: processedImage.fragmentDimensions
-        });
-      }
-
       finalImage = processedImage;
     }
     

backend/src/routes/secureImages.js

@@ -120,8 +120,6 @@ router.get('/:slug/secure/:photoId/:token',
         tokenLength: token?.length,
         hasAuthHeader: Boolean(req.headers.authorization),
       });
-      const { fragment } = req.query;
-
       // Verify secure token
       const tokenValidation = secureImageService.verifySecureToken(
         token,
@@ -212,8 +210,7 @@ router.get('/:slug/secure/:photoId/:token',
       const protectionSettings = {
         protectionLevel: event.protection_level || 'standard',
         quality: event.image_quality || 85,
-        addFingerprint: event.add_fingerprint !== false,
-        fragmentImage: event.use_canvas_rendering === true && fragment !== undefined
+        addFingerprint: event.add_fingerprint !== false
       };
 
       let processedImage;
@@ -232,11 +229,6 @@ router.get('/:slug/secure/:photoId/:token',
         return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Photo file not found' });
       }
 
-      // Handle fragmented images
-      if (processedImage.type === 'fragmented') {
-        return await handleFragmentedImage(req, res, processedImage, fragment);
-      }
-
       // Log successful access
       await secureImageService.logImageAccess(
         photoId,
@@ -267,58 +259,6 @@ router.get('/:slug/secure/:photoId/:token',
   }
 );
 
-/**
- * Handle fragmented image delivery
- */
-async function handleFragmentedImage(req, res, fragmentedImage, fragmentIndex) {
-  const { photoId } = req.params;
-  
-  try {
-    if (fragmentIndex === undefined) {
-      // Return fragment metadata
-      res.json({
-        type: 'fragmented',
-        fragments: fragmentedImage.fragments.length,
-        dimensions: fragmentedImage.originalDimensions,
-        fragmentDimensions: fragmentedImage.fragmentDimensions
-      });
-      return;
-    }
-
-    const index = parseInt(fragmentIndex);
-    if (isNaN(index) || index < 0 || index >= fragmentedImage.fragments.length) {
-      return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid fragment index' });
-    }
-
-    const fragment = fragmentedImage.fragments[index];
-    
-    // Log fragment access
-    await secureImageService.logImageAccess(
-      photoId,
-      req.event.id,
-      req.clientInfo,
-      `fragment_${index}`
-    );
-
-    res.set({
-      'Content-Type': 'image/jpeg',
-      'Content-Length': fragment.buffer.length,
-      'X-Fragment-Index': index,
-      'X-Fragment-Position': JSON.stringify(fragment.position)
-    });
-
-    res.send(fragment.buffer);
-
-  } catch (error) {
-    logger.error('Error serving image fragment', {
-      error: error.message,
-      fragmentIndex,
-      photoId
-    });
-    res.status(500).json({ error: 'Failed to serve image fragment' });
-  }
-}
-
 /**
  * Download protected image with watermark
  */

backend/src/routes/v1/__tests__/events.create.test.js

@@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ const BASE_BODY = {
 const baseSettingsChains = () => [
   buildChain({ firstResult: null }), // feedback default
   buildChain({ firstResult: null }), // devtools default
+  buildChain({ selectResult: [] }),  // image-security whereIn → empty rows (#1296)
   buildChain({ selectResult: [] }),  // branding whereIn → empty rows
 ];
 
@@ -169,19 +170,21 @@ describe('v1 POST /events — issue #550 (color_theme + feedback row)', () => {
   it('creates event_feedback_settings row when feedback_enabled=true is sent', async () => {
     // feedback_enabled provided → feedback probe SKIPPED. Sequence:
     //   1. devtools probe
-    //   2. branding probe (whereIn → select)
-    //   3. slug probe
-    //   4. events insert
-    //   5. feedback sub-toggle defaults probe (whereIn → select, #1044)
-    //   6. event_feedback_settings insert
+    //   2. image-security probe (whereIn → select, #1296)
+    //   3. branding probe (whereIn → select)
+    //   4. slug probe
+    //   5. events insert
+    //   6. feedback sub-toggle defaults probe (whereIn → select, #1044)
+    //   7. event_feedback_settings insert
     const devtoolsChain = buildChain({ firstResult: null });
+    const imageSecurityChain = buildChain({ selectResult: [] });
     const brandingChain = buildChain({ selectResult: [] });
     const slugChain = buildChain({ firstResult: null });
     const insertChain = buildChain({ returningResult: [{ id: 50 }] });
     const feedbackDefaultsChain = buildChain({ selectResult: [] });
     const feedbackInsertChain = buildChain();
     db.__setImplementations(
-      devtoolsChain, brandingChain, slugChain, insertChain,
+      devtoolsChain, imageSecurityChain, brandingChain, slugChain, insertChain,
       feedbackDefaultsChain, feedbackInsertChain,
     );
 
@@ -190,7 +193,7 @@ describe('v1 POST /events — issue #550 (color_theme + feedback row)', () => {
       .send({ ...BASE_BODY, feedback_enabled: true })
       .expect(201);
 
-    expect(db).toHaveBeenNthCalledWith(6, 'event_feedback_settings');
+    expect(db).toHaveBeenNthCalledWith(7, 'event_feedback_settings');
 
     const feedbackRow = feedbackInsertChain.insert.mock.calls[0][0];
     expect(feedbackRow).toMatchObject({ event_id: 50 });
@@ -216,20 +219,21 @@ describe('v1 POST /events — issue #550 (color_theme + feedback row)', () => {
   it('honours the event_default_feedback_enabled global when body omits feedback_enabled', async () => {
     // Feedback probe returns serialized "true" → fallback kicks in and
     // the feedback insert runs. Sequence: feedback probe, devtools probe,
-    // branding probe, slug, insert, sub-toggle defaults probe (#1044),
-    // feedback insert (7 calls total).
+    // image-security probe (#1296), branding probe, slug, insert, sub-toggle
+    // defaults probe (#1044), feedback insert (8 calls total).
     const feedbackProbe = buildChain({
       firstResult: { setting_key: 'event_default_feedback_enabled', setting_value: 'true' },
     });
     const devtoolsChain = buildChain({ firstResult: null });
+    const imageSecurityChain = buildChain({ selectResult: [] });
     const brandingChain = buildChain({ selectResult: [] });
     const slugChain = buildChain({ firstResult: null });
     const insertChain = buildChain({ returningResult: [{ id: 51 }] });
     const feedbackDefaultsChain = buildChain({ selectResult: [] });
     const feedbackInsertChain = buildChain();
     db.__setImplementations(
-      feedbackProbe, devtoolsChain, brandingChain, slugChain, insertChain,
-      feedbackDefaultsChain, feedbackInsertChain,
+      feedbackProbe, devtoolsChain, imageSecurityChain, brandingChain, slugChain,
+      insertChain, feedbackDefaultsChain, feedbackInsertChain,
     );
 
     await request(buildApp())
@@ -237,7 +241,7 @@ describe('v1 POST /events — issue #550 (color_theme + feedback row)', () => {
       .send(BASE_BODY)
       .expect(201);
 
-    expect(db).toHaveBeenNthCalledWith(7, 'event_feedback_settings');
+    expect(db).toHaveBeenNthCalledWith(8, 'event_feedback_settings');
     expect(feedbackInsertChain.insert).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
   });
 
@@ -251,9 +255,9 @@ describe('v1 POST /events — issue #550 (color_theme + feedback row)', () => {
       .send(BASE_BODY)
       .expect(201);
 
-    // 5 db() calls: feedback + devtools + branding probes, slug, insert.
-    // event_feedback_settings is never touched.
-    expect(db).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(5);
+    // 6 db() calls: feedback + devtools + image-security + branding probes,
+    // slug, insert. event_feedback_settings is never touched.
+    expect(db).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(6);
     expect(db).not.toHaveBeenCalledWith('event_feedback_settings');
   });
 

backend/src/routes/v1/events.js

@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ const logger = require('../../utils/logger');
 const { slugify } = require('../../utils/slug');
 const { formatBoolean } = require('../../utils/dbCompat');
 const { parseBooleanInput } = require('../../utils/parsers');
+const { getImageSecurityDefaults, resolveImageSecurityColumns, decodeSettingValue } = require('../adminEvents/helpers');
 const { isValidEventType } = require('../../services/eventTypeService');
 const { replacePhoto } = require('../../services/photoReplacementService');
 const { getMaxFileSizeBytes, DEFAULT_MAX_FILE_SIZE_MB } = require('../../services/uploadSettings');
@@ -134,6 +135,9 @@ const photoUpload = async (req, res, next) => {
  *               color_theme: { type: string, nullable: true, description: "Preset name (e.g. 'default') or JSON-encoded ThemeConfig. Persisted as-is on the event row." }
  *               feedback_enabled: { type: boolean, nullable: true, description: "Enable guest feedback for this gallery. When omitted, falls back to the global event_default_feedback_enabled setting." }
  *               enable_devtools_protection: { type: boolean, nullable: true, description: "Block right-click / devtools shortcuts in the gallery. When omitted, falls back to the global enable_devtools_protection setting." }
+ *               protection_level: { type: string, nullable: true, enum: [basic, standard, enhanced, maximum], description: "Image protection level. When omitted, falls back to the global default_protection_level setting." }
+ *               use_canvas_rendering: { type: boolean, nullable: true, description: "Render gallery images to a canvas instead of an img tag. When omitted, falls back to the global enable_canvas_rendering setting." }
+ *               image_quality: { type: integer, minimum: 1, maximum: 100, nullable: true, description: "Served image quality percentage. When omitted, falls back to the global default_image_quality setting." }
  *               hero_logo_visible: { type: boolean, nullable: true, description: "Show event logo in the hero block. When omitted, falls back to the global branding_logo_display_hero setting." }
  *               hero_logo_size: { type: string, nullable: true, enum: [small, medium, large, xlarge], description: "Hero logo size. When omitted, falls back to the global branding_logo_size setting." }
  *               hero_logo_position: { type: string, nullable: true, enum: [top, center, bottom], description: "Hero logo position. Defaults to 'top' (not settings-backed — see migration 084)." }
@@ -179,6 +183,9 @@ router.post(
     body('color_theme').optional({ nullable: true }).isString().trim(),
     body('feedback_enabled').optional().isBoolean(),
     body('enable_devtools_protection').optional().isBoolean(),
+    body('protection_level').optional().not().isArray().isIn(['basic', 'standard', 'enhanced', 'maximum']),
+    body('use_canvas_rendering').optional().not().isArray().isBoolean().toBoolean(),
+    body('image_quality').optional().not().isArray().isInt({ min: 1, max: 100 }).toInt(),
     body('hero_logo_visible').optional().isBoolean(),
     body('hero_logo_size').optional().isIn(['small', 'medium', 'large', 'xlarge']),
     body('hero_logo_position').optional().isIn(['top', 'center', 'bottom'])
@@ -227,14 +234,24 @@ router.post(
       if (devtoolsInput === undefined) {
         const setting = await db('app_settings').where('setting_key', 'enable_devtools_protection').first();
         if (setting) {
-          try {
-            const parsed = JSON.parse(setting.setting_value);
-            if (typeof parsed === 'boolean') devtoolsFallback = parsed;
-          } catch { /* keep true */ }
+          // Shared decoder: a legacy row can carry several layers of JSON
+          // quoting, and a single parse would leave the string 'false' here,
+          // reject it, and quietly enable protection the operator disabled.
+          const parsed = decodeSettingValue(setting.setting_value);
+          if (typeof parsed === 'boolean') devtoolsFallback = parsed;
         }
       }
       const enable_devtools_protection = parseBooleanInput(devtoolsInput, devtoolsFallback);
 
+      // #1296 — same shape again, for the four Image Security settings that
+      // were stored and applied nowhere. Shared with the admin create route
+      // so a gallery's security level does not depend on which endpoint made
+      // it; #592 above is the bug this would otherwise repeat.
+      const imageSecurityColumns = resolveImageSecurityColumns(
+        req.body,
+        await getImageSecurityDefaults(),
+      );
+
       // Same shape as the feedback / devtools fallbacks: honour the global
       // event_default_require_password toggle (#317). Without this an admin
       // who disabled "require password by default" globally still got
@@ -324,6 +341,8 @@ router.post(
         // Issue #592 — write the resolved devtools setting (input value
         // or global fallback) so the column default doesn't shadow it.
         enable_devtools_protection: formatBoolean(enable_devtools_protection),
+        // Request value, else the global default, else the column default.
+        ...imageSecurityColumns,
         // Branding inheritance — resolved value from body or app_settings.
         hero_logo_visible: formatBoolean(hero_logo_visible),
         hero_logo_size,

backend/src/services/contract/conversions.js

@@ -229,6 +229,8 @@ async function convertToEvent(contractId, adminId) {
     || (await resolveDefaultEventType());
 
   const eventCols = await db('events').columnInfo();
+  const { getImageSecurityDefaults, resolveImageSecurityColumns } = require('../../routes/adminEvents/helpers');
+  const imageSecurityColumns = resolveImageSecurityColumns({}, await getImageSecurityDefaults());
   const candidate = {
     slug: `contract-${contract.contract_number.toLowerCase()}-${crypto.randomBytes(3).toString('hex')}`,
     // Prefer the contract's event_name snapshot (set on the contract
@@ -255,6 +257,11 @@ async function convertToEvent(contractId, adminId) {
     quote_id: null,
     created_at: new Date(),
     updated_at: new Date(),
+    // #1296 — a signed standalone contract converts straight to a gallery
+    // here, without going through quoteService, so the global Image Security
+    // defaults have to be applied on this path too. Not inside a transaction,
+    // so the global db read is fine.
+    ...imageSecurityColumns,
   };
   const eventRow = {};
   for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(candidate)) {

backend/src/services/newsletterService.js

@@ -141,35 +141,81 @@ function sanitizeCampaignBody(html) {
     },
   })
     // sanitize-html keeps the style ATTRIBUTE contents verbatim. Clean each.
-    .replace(/style="([^"]*)"/gi, (match, css) => {
-      const { sanitized } = sanitizeCSS(css);
-      const cleaned = stripRemoteCssUrls(sanitized);
-      return cleaned ? `style="${cleaned.replace(/"/g, '')}"` : '';
-    });
+    // sanitizeCSS blocks remote url() properly as of #1290 — it lexes the CSS
+    // rather than pattern-matching it, so the local pass this used to need is
+    // gone. Keeping a second copy would mean two definitions of "disallowed"
+    // drifting apart.
+    //
+    // Entities are decoded BEFORE the CSS is scanned, and re-encoded after.
+    // sanitize-html emits `"` inside an attribute as `"`, so the scanner
+    // and the recipient's browser otherwise disagree about where CSS strings
+    // begin: in `style="font-family:"don't";background:url(...)"`
+    // the browser decodes first and reads the apostrophe as ordinary text
+    // inside a real string, then makes the url() request — while the scanner
+    // saw the apostrophe open a string and skipped everything after it. The
+    // scanner has to be shown what the browser will actually parse.
+    .replace(STYLE_ATTRIBUTE, sanitizeStyleAttribute);
+}
+
+/** Shared by the write-time sanitize and the post-substitution recheck. */
+const STYLE_ATTRIBUTE = /style="([^"]*)"/gi;
+
+function sanitizeStyleAttribute(match, css) {
+  const { sanitized } = sanitizeCSS(decodeHtmlEntities(css));
+  return sanitized ? `style="${encodeForAttribute(sanitized)}"` : '';
 }
 
 /**
- * Remove every `url(...)` that is not an inline data: image.
+ * Re-check inline CSS AFTER template substitution.
  *
- * The shared `sanitizeCSS` *detects* a remote url() and prefixes it with a
- * `/* BLOCKED URL *\/` comment — but a CSS comment is stripped during
- * tokenization, so the declaration a mail client actually parses still
- * carries the live URL. Verified:
+ * Sanitizing runs on the stored body, but `safeTemplateReplace` rewrites it
+ * afterwards — so the string that was validated is not the string that gets
+ * sent. A conditional inside a style attribute can delete the very characters
+ * that made a URL inert:
  *
- *   sanitizeCSS('.a{background:url(https://x/p.gif)}').sanitized
- *     → '.a{background:/* BLOCKED URL *\/ url(https://x/p.gif)}'
+ *   style="--x:x{{#if company_name}}'{{/if}};background:url(https://evil…)"
  *
- * In a newsletter that is a tracking pixel delivered to every recipient, so
- * this pass actually removes the token. Scoped to the newsletter path on
- * purpose: the same weakness affects gallery custom CSS, but changing shared
- * sanitizer behaviour is a separate change with its own blast radius.
+ * At sanitize time the url() sits inside a CSS string and is correctly left
+ * alone; once the conditional is expanded the quotes are gone and the
+ * background is live. No amount of lexer correctness fixes that, because the
+ * text being lexed is not the text being delivered — the check has to run
+ * again on the final output. Substitution cannot introduce a `"` (values are
+ * HTML-escaped), so the attribute regex still matches what it should.
  */
-function stripRemoteCssUrls(css) {
-  if (!css) return '';
-  return String(css)
-    .replace(/\/\*\s*BLOCKED URL\s*\*\//gi, '')
-    .replace(/url\s*\(\s*(['"]?)([^)'"]*)\1\s*\)/gi, (match, _quote, target) =>
-      (/^data:image\/(?:jpeg|jpg|png|gif|webp)/i.test(target.trim()) ? match : 'none'));
+function sanitizeInlineStylesAfterSubstitution(html) {
+  if (!html) return html;
+  return String(html).replace(STYLE_ATTRIBUTE, sanitizeStyleAttribute);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Decode the HTML entities sanitize-html emits inside attribute values, so
+ * CSS is scanned in the form the recipient's parser will see. One pass, so
+ * `"` decodes to `"` and not to `"`.
+ */
+function decodeHtmlEntities(value) {
+  return String(value).replace(
+    /&(?:#(\d+)|#[xX]([0-9a-fA-F]+)|(quot|apos|amp|lt|gt));/g,
+    (whole, dec, hex, name) => {
+      if (dec !== undefined) {
+        const code = Number(dec);
+        return code >= 0 && code <= 0x10ffff ? String.fromCodePoint(code) : whole;
+      }
+      if (hex !== undefined) {
+        const code = parseInt(hex, 16);
+        return code >= 0 && code <= 0x10ffff ? String.fromCodePoint(code) : whole;
+      }
+      return { quot: '"', apos: '\'', amp: '&', lt: '<', gt: '>' }[name];
+    }
+  );
+}
+
+/** Re-encode a sanitized value so it is safe inside a double-quoted attribute. */
+function encodeForAttribute(value) {
+  return String(value)
+    .replace(/&/g, '&amp;')
+    .replace(/"/g, '&quot;')
+    .replace(/</g, '&lt;')
+    .replace(/>/g, '&gt;');
 }
 
 /**
@@ -178,7 +224,8 @@ function stripRemoteCssUrls(css) {
  * `javascript:` and every `url()` that is not a `data:` image.
  *
  * That is STRICTER than the issue's "https: images only" note — the shared
- * sanitizer allows no remote `url()` at all. Kept as-is rather than loosened:
+ * sanitizer allows no remote `url()` at all, and since #1290 it enforces
+ * that by lexing rather than by pattern-matching. Kept as-is rather than loosened:
  * a remote CSS url() in mail is a tracking pixel by another name, and a
  * campaign's images belong in `<img>` tags where the scheme filter sees them.
  *
@@ -187,7 +234,7 @@ function stripRemoteCssUrls(css) {
 function sanitizeCampaignCss(css) {
   if (!css) return { css: '', warnings: [] };
   const { sanitized, warnings } = sanitizeCSS(String(css));
-  return { css: stripRemoteCssUrls(sanitized), warnings };
+  return { css: sanitized, warnings };
 }
 
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -310,7 +357,12 @@ async function renderForRecipient(campaign, customer, options = {}) {
   // Substitution happens AFTER sanitizing, with escaping on: a customer's own
   // company name is untrusted text and must not be able to inject markup by
   // riding in through a variable the sanitizer never saw.
-  const body = safeTemplateReplace(safeBody, variables, { escapeHtml: true });
+  // Re-checked after substitution, not only before it: expansion can remove
+  // the quoting that made a url() inert at sanitize time. See
+  // sanitizeInlineStylesAfterSubstitution.
+  const body = sanitizeInlineStylesAfterSubstitution(
+    safeTemplateReplace(safeBody, variables, { escapeHtml: true })
+  );
   const subject = safeTemplateReplace(campaign.subject || '', variables);
 
   const { css } = sanitizeCampaignCss(campaign.body_css);
@@ -922,6 +974,7 @@ async function sendTest(campaignId, toEmail, adminId) {
 
 module.exports = {
   sanitizeCampaignBody,
+  sanitizeInlineStylesAfterSubstitution,
   sanitizeCampaignCss,
   unsubscribeToken,
   verifyUnsubscribeToken,

backend/src/services/quoteService.js

@@ -1683,6 +1683,8 @@ async function convertToEvent(quoteId, adminId, options = {}) {
     // ask the DB which columns exist and only keep the matching pairs
     // — bullet-proof against schema drift in either direction.
     const eventCols = await trx('events').columnInfo();
+    const { getImageSecurityDefaults, resolveImageSecurityColumns } = require('../routes/adminEvents/helpers');
+    const imageSecurityColumns = resolveImageSecurityColumns({}, await getImageSecurityDefaults(trx));
     const candidate = {
       slug: `quote-${quote.quote_number.toLowerCase()}-${crypto.randomBytes(3).toString('hex')}`,
       event_name: quote.event_name || `Event ${quote.quote_number}`,
@@ -1705,6 +1707,11 @@ async function convertToEvent(quoteId, adminId, options = {}) {
       quote_id: quote.id,
       created_at: new Date(),
       updated_at: new Date(),
+      // #1296 — a converted quote produces a real gallery, so the global
+      // Image Security defaults have to reach it too. Required lazily: this
+      // is a service reaching into a route helper, and the lazy form keeps
+      // the module graph acyclic the way the storage require below does.
+      ...imageSecurityColumns,
     };
     const eventRow = {};
     for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(candidate)) {

backend/src/services/secureImageService.js

@@ -175,8 +175,7 @@ class SecureImageService {
       quality = 85,
       maxWidth = 1920,
       maxHeight = 1080,
-      addFingerprint = true,
-      fragmentImage = false
+      addFingerprint = true
     } = options;
 
     try {
@@ -187,7 +186,7 @@ class SecureImageService {
 
       // For standard protection without fingerprinting, return original file
       // This avoids unnecessary recompression when no protection features are needed
-      if (protectionLevel === 'standard' && !addFingerprint && !fragmentImage) {
+      if (protectionLevel === 'standard' && !addFingerprint) {
         return await fs.readFile(imagePath);
       }
 
@@ -268,14 +267,7 @@ class SecureImageService {
         });
       }
 
-      const buffer = await image.toBuffer();
-
-      // Fragment image if requested (for canvas reconstruction)
-      if (fragmentImage && protectionLevel === 'maximum') {
-        return await this.fragmentImageBuffer(buffer, metadata);
-      }
-
-      return buffer;
+      return await image.toBuffer();
     } catch (error) {
       logger.error('Error processing protected image:', error);
       // Return original on error
@@ -283,51 +275,6 @@ class SecureImageService {
     }
   }
 
-  /**
-   * Fragment image into multiple pieces for canvas reconstruction
-   */
-  async fragmentImageBuffer(buffer, metadata) {
-    const { width, height } = metadata;
-    const fragments = [];
-    
-    // Create 3x3 grid of fragments
-    const cols = 3;
-    const rows = 3;
-    const fragmentWidth = Math.floor(width / cols);
-    const fragmentHeight = Math.floor(height / rows);
-
-    for (let row = 0; row < rows; row++) {
-      for (let col = 0; col < cols; col++) {
-        const left = col * fragmentWidth;
-        const top = row * fragmentHeight;
-        
-        const fragment = await sharp(buffer)
-          .extract({ 
-            left, 
-            top, 
-            width: fragmentWidth, 
-            height: fragmentHeight 
-          })
-          .toBuffer();
-          
-        fragments.push({
-          index: row * cols + col,
-          row,
-          col,
-          buffer: fragment,
-          position: { left, top, width: fragmentWidth, height: fragmentHeight }
-        });
-      }
-    }
-
-    return {
-      type: 'fragmented',
-      fragments,
-      originalDimensions: { width, height },
-      fragmentDimensions: { width: fragmentWidth, height: fragmentHeight, cols, rows }
-    };
-  }
-
   /**
    * Log image access for security monitoring
    */

backend/src/utils/cssSanitizer.js

@@ -147,11 +147,27 @@ function stripDisallowedUrls(css) {
     if (input[i] === '"' || input[i] === '\'') {
       const quote = input[i];
       let j = i + 1;
+      let closed = false;
       while (j < input.length) {
         if (input[j] === '\\') { j += 2; continue; }
-        if (input[j] === quote) { j += 1; break; }
+        // A newline ends a string in CSS (it produces a bad-string token), so
+        // an unclosed quote must not run past the end of its own line.
+        if (input[j] === '\n' || input[j] === '\r' || input[j] === '\f') break;
+        if (input[j] === quote) { j += 1; closed = true; break; }
         j += 1;
       }
+      // An UNTERMINATED quote is a parse error, and trusting it is how a
+      // stray apostrophe hid everything after it: `font-family:&quot;don't`
+      // opened a string that swallowed the url() following it, while the
+      // recipient's browser — which decodes the entity first — saw the
+      // apostrophe safely inside a real string and made the request. Failing
+      // closed here means emitting the quote as an ordinary character and
+      // carrying on scanning, so a later url() is still examined.
+      if (!closed) {
+        out += input[i];
+        i += 1;
+        continue;
+      }
       out += input.slice(i, Math.min(j, input.length));
       i = Math.min(j, input.length);
       continue;
@@ -161,7 +177,7 @@ function stripDisallowedUrls(css) {
     const ident = readIdentifier(input, i);
     if (ident.end > i && decodeCssEscapes(ident.raw).toLowerCase() === 'url') {
       let j = ident.end;
-      while (j < input.length && /\s/.test(input[j])) j += 1;
+      while (j < input.length && CSS_WS.test(input[j])) j += 1;
       if (input[j] === '(') {
         const token = readUrlToken(input, j);
         if (token) {
@@ -185,6 +201,19 @@ function stripDisallowedUrls(css) {
       continue;
     }
 
+    // --- escape that does NOT begin an identifier -------------------------
+    // Ordered AFTER readIdentifier deliberately. `\75` is the escape for
+    // `u`, so `\75rl(...)` is url() to a browser — consuming the escape
+    // first would hide it from the check above, which is a bypass this
+    // branch introduced when it ran earlier. What is left for it is the
+    // `\'` case: an escaped quote that must not be read as opening a
+    // string, since that swallowed the rest of the stylesheet unscanned.
+    if (input[i] === '\\' && i + 1 < input.length) {
+      out += input.slice(i, i + 2);
+      i += 2;
+      continue;
+    }
+
     out += input[i];
     i += 1;
   }
@@ -209,6 +238,15 @@ function matchEscape(input, start) {
  * escaped Tailwind selector) is emitted byte-identical rather than silently
  * rewritten to `.w-1/2`, which is a different selector.
  */
+// CSS whitespace is exactly space, tab, LF, CR and FF. JavaScript's `\s`
+// is NOT the same set — it also matches NBSP and the other Unicode spaces,
+// and that difference was a bypass: in `url(\u00a0"data:image/png);...")`
+// the scanner skipped the NBSP as whitespace and read the following quote as
+// a legitimate quoted data: URI, swallowing a remote url() inside it. A
+// browser treats NBSP as an ordinary character, making that an UNQUOTED
+// url-token that ends at the first `)` — leaving the remote background live.
+const CSS_WS = /[ \t\n\r\f]/;
+
 function readIdentifier(input, start) {
   let j = start;
   let raw = '';
@@ -228,7 +266,7 @@ function readIdentifier(input, start) {
 function readUrlToken(input, openParen) {
   let j = openParen + 1;
   let target = '';
-  while (j < input.length && /\s/.test(input[j])) j += 1;
+  while (j < input.length && CSS_WS.test(input[j])) j += 1;
 
   if (input[j] === '"' || input[j] === '\'') {
     // Quoted: the quote closes the value, so ")" inside it is content.
@@ -249,7 +287,7 @@ function readUrlToken(input, openParen) {
     }
   }
 
-  while (j < input.length && /\s/.test(input[j])) j += 1;
+  while (j < input.length && CSS_WS.test(input[j])) j += 1;
   // Unterminated url( — malformed. Leave it alone rather than swallowing the
   // remainder of the stylesheet.
   if (input[j] !== ')') return null;
@@ -291,12 +329,35 @@ function sanitizeCSS(cssContent) {
   // Remove HTML comments that might be used for injection
   sanitized = sanitized.replace(/<!--[\s\S]*?-->/g, '');
 
-  // URLs are scanned AFTER the comment strip, not before. Removing
-  // `<!--x-->` from `u<!--x-->rl(https://evil.example/p.gif)` JOINS the
-  // remaining characters into a live `url(...)` — so a scan that ran first
-  // saw no token, reported the input clean, and the transformation below it
-  // then produced exactly the request the scan was there to prevent. Any
-  // pass that can join tokens has to happen before validation, not after.
+  // Remove control characters BEFORE the URL scan. This is the same
+  // token-joining hazard as the HTML-comment strip above: dropping the
+  // \u0001 from `u\u0001rl(https://evil.example/p.gif)` joins the remainder
+  // into a live `url(...)`, so a scan that ran first saw no token and
+  // reported the input clean. Newlines are control characters too, which
+  // made `u\nrl(...)` the same bypass in ordinary-looking CSS.
+  // eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex -- intentional: strips control chars from untrusted CSS
+  sanitized = sanitized.replace(/[\u0000-\u001F\u007F]/g, '');
+
+  // URLs are scanned AFTER the comment and control-character strips, not
+  // before. Removing `<!--x-->` from `u<!--x-->rl(https://evil.example/p.gif)`
+  // JOINS the remaining characters into a live `url(...)` — so a scan that
+  // ran first saw no token, reported the input clean, and the transformation
+  // below it then produced exactly the request the scan was there to
+  // prevent. Any pass that can join tokens has to happen before validation,
+  // not after.
+  // Remove any remaining script-like content. This is the LAST pass that can
+  // move text, and so it must run before the URL scan, not after: it deletes
+  // the matched span, and a span like `<">` takes a quote with it. That is
+  // how `--x:x<">;background:url(https://evil.example/p.gif);--y:x<">` shipped
+  // a live background — the scanner saw the url() safely inside a string, and
+  // this line then removed the quotes that made it so.
+  sanitized = sanitized.replace(/<[^>]*>/g, '/* BLOCKED TAG */');
+
+  // URL validation runs LAST, deliberately. Every pass above rewrites the
+  // text, and each one that did so after this point has produced a bypass:
+  // the HTML-comment strip (#1290), the control-character strip, and the tag
+  // strip immediately above. Validating anything other than the final bytes
+  // means validating a string that is not the one that gets served.
   const urlPass = stripDisallowedUrls(sanitized);
   if (urlPass.blocked > 0) {
     warnings.push(
@@ -306,13 +367,6 @@ function sanitizeCSS(cssContent) {
     sanitized = urlPass.sanitized;
   }
 
-  // Remove control characters
-  // eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex -- intentional: strips control chars from untrusted CSS
-  sanitized = sanitized.replace(/[\u0000-\u001F\u007F]/g, '');
-
-  // Remove any remaining script-like content
-  sanitized = sanitized.replace(/<[^>]*>/g, '/* BLOCKED TAG */');
-
   return { sanitized: sanitized.trim(), warnings };
 }