fix(security): use CSS whitespace, not JavaScript's, in the url() reader
Third bypass of this scanner found in one review pass, and the same
shape as the others: the lexer and a browser disagreeing about where a
token begins.
JavaScript's `\s` matches U+00A0; CSS whitespace is exactly space, tab,
LF, CR and FF. Skipping an NBSP as whitespace let the scanner read the
quote after it as a legitimate quoted data: URI and swallow a remote
url() inside that "string" —
.a{background:url(<NBSP>"data:image/png);background:url(https://evil…);--x:");}
came through untouched, with no warning, and survived re-sanitising. A
browser treats NBSP as an ordinary character, so that is an UNQUOTED
url-token ending at the first `)`, leaving the remote background live.
All three token readers now use an explicit CSS whitespace class.
Ordinary spacing around a data: URI still works, and is pinned.
Refs #1264
This commit is contained in:
@@ -260,6 +260,25 @@ describe('sanitizeCSS', () => {
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expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
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expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
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});
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});
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it('does not treat NBSP as CSS whitespace inside url()', () => {
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// JS `\s` matches U+00A0; CSS whitespace does not. Skipping it let the
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// scanner read the following quote as a legitimate data: URI and swallow
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// a remote url() inside the "string", while a browser sees an unquoted
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// url-token ending at the first `)` and fetches the remote background.
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const NBSP = '\u00a0';
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const { sanitized } = sanitizeCSS(
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`.a{background:url(${NBSP}"data:image/png);background:url(https://evil.example/p.gif);--x:");}`
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);
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expect(asParsed(sanitized)).not.toContain('evil.example');
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});
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it('still allows ordinary CSS whitespace around a data: URI', () => {
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const spaced = sanitizeCSS('.a{background:url( "" )}');
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expect(spaced.sanitized).toContain('data:image/png');
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const tabbed = sanitizeCSS('.a{background:url(\t"")}');
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expect(tabbed.sanitized).toContain('data:image/png');
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});
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it('does not let an unterminated quote hide everything after it', () => {
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it('does not let an unterminated quote hide everything after it', () => {
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// An unclosed quote is a parse error. Trusting it meant one stray
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// An unclosed quote is a parse error. Trusting it meant one stray
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// apostrophe disabled scanning for the remainder of the stylesheet, so
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// apostrophe disabled scanning for the remainder of the stylesheet, so
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@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ function stripDisallowedUrls(css) {
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const ident = readIdentifier(input, i);
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const ident = readIdentifier(input, i);
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if (ident.end > i && decodeCssEscapes(ident.raw).toLowerCase() === 'url') {
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if (ident.end > i && decodeCssEscapes(ident.raw).toLowerCase() === 'url') {
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let j = ident.end;
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let j = ident.end;
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while (j < input.length && /\s/.test(input[j])) j += 1;
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while (j < input.length && CSS_WS.test(input[j])) j += 1;
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if (input[j] === '(') {
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if (input[j] === '(') {
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const token = readUrlToken(input, j);
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const token = readUrlToken(input, j);
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if (token) {
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if (token) {
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@@ -238,6 +238,15 @@ function matchEscape(input, start) {
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* escaped Tailwind selector) is emitted byte-identical rather than silently
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* escaped Tailwind selector) is emitted byte-identical rather than silently
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* rewritten to `.w-1/2`, which is a different selector.
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* rewritten to `.w-1/2`, which is a different selector.
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*/
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*/
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// CSS whitespace is exactly space, tab, LF, CR and FF. JavaScript's `\s`
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// is NOT the same set — it also matches NBSP and the other Unicode spaces,
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// and that difference was a bypass: in `url(\u00a0"data:image/png);...")`
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// the scanner skipped the NBSP as whitespace and read the following quote as
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// a legitimate quoted data: URI, swallowing a remote url() inside it. A
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// browser treats NBSP as an ordinary character, making that an UNQUOTED
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// url-token that ends at the first `)` — leaving the remote background live.
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const CSS_WS = /[ \t\n\r\f]/;
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function readIdentifier(input, start) {
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function readIdentifier(input, start) {
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let j = start;
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let j = start;
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let raw = '';
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let raw = '';
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@@ -257,7 +266,7 @@ function readIdentifier(input, start) {
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function readUrlToken(input, openParen) {
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function readUrlToken(input, openParen) {
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let j = openParen + 1;
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let j = openParen + 1;
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let target = '';
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let target = '';
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while (j < input.length && /\s/.test(input[j])) j += 1;
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while (j < input.length && CSS_WS.test(input[j])) j += 1;
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if (input[j] === '"' || input[j] === '\'') {
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if (input[j] === '"' || input[j] === '\'') {
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// Quoted: the quote closes the value, so ")" inside it is content.
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// Quoted: the quote closes the value, so ")" inside it is content.
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@@ -278,7 +287,7 @@ function readUrlToken(input, openParen) {
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}
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}
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}
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}
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while (j < input.length && /\s/.test(input[j])) j += 1;
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while (j < input.length && CSS_WS.test(input[j])) j += 1;
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// Unterminated url( — malformed. Leave it alone rather than swallowing the
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// Unterminated url( — malformed. Leave it alone rather than swallowing the
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// remainder of the stylesheet.
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// remainder of the stylesheet.
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if (input[j] !== ')') return null;
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if (input[j] !== ')') return null;
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