fix(backend): contain and sanitize the SQLite restore source path (#1384)
The restore flow accepted an unvalidated database.backup_file from the manifest (absolute paths and traversal both worked, and no containment check enforced the configured backup root), then interpolated it unescaped into a `sqlite3 .restore '<path>'` command, letting an attacker-chosen source file replace the live database. Co-authored-by: Paul Nothaft <[email protected]>
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co-authored by
Paul Nothaft
parent
ec03089d57
commit
316bcbd679
@@ -22,29 +22,38 @@ process.env.JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'restorepath-test-secret';
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const { bootCrmDb, seedMinimal } = require('../integration/helpers/crmDb');
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// `bootCrmDb()` hands back the process-wide `db` singleton (module cache —
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// see its own comment), so it must only be called ONCE per test file: a
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// second call re-runs migrations against the same connection, and the first
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// call's `cleanup()` (db.destroy()) would tear down the connection both
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// describe blocks below share. Boot once at file scope; each describe below
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// only touches app_settings / env vars, never the connection lifecycle.
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let db; let cleanup; let checkRestorePathsAllowed;
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beforeAll(async () => {
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({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
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await seedMinimal(db);
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({ checkRestorePathsAllowed } = require('../../src/routes/adminRestore')._internal);
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}, 120000);
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afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
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async function setBackupSetting(key, value) {
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const existing = await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: key }).first();
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if (existing) {
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await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: key }).update({ setting_value: JSON.stringify(value) });
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} else {
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await db('app_settings').insert({
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setting_key: key, setting_value: JSON.stringify(value), setting_type: 'backup',
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});
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}
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}
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describe('restore path allowlist (GHSA-fw4c)', () => {
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let db; let cleanup; let checkRestorePathsAllowed;
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beforeAll(async () => {
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({ db, cleanup } = await bootCrmDb());
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await seedMinimal(db);
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// Configure a backup root so the allowlist is actually active.
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for (const [key, value] of [['backup_destination_path', '/backup']]) {
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const existing = await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: key }).first();
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if (existing) {
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await db('app_settings').where({ setting_key: key }).update({ setting_value: JSON.stringify(value) });
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} else {
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await db('app_settings').insert({
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setting_key: key, setting_value: JSON.stringify(value), setting_type: 'backup',
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});
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}
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}
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({ checkRestorePathsAllowed } = require('../../src/routes/adminRestore')._internal);
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}, 120000);
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afterAll(async () => { if (cleanup) await cleanup(); });
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await setBackupSetting('backup_destination_path', '/backup');
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});
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it('allows the wizard\'s source TYPE tokens', async () => {
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for (const source of ['local', 's3', 'upload']) {
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@@ -84,3 +93,89 @@ describe('restore path allowlist (GHSA-fw4c)', () => {
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expect(err).toBeNull();
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});
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});
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/**
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* GHSA-xfvx-j447-732c: `checkRestorePathsAllowed` constrained the top-level
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* `source`/`manifestPath` request fields (GHSA-fw4c above), but never looked
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* INSIDE the manifest itself. `manifest.database.backup_file` — handed
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* straight to restoreService's candidate resolution and eventually
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* interpolated into `sqlite3 .restore '<path>'` — was unchecked, so an
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* absolute path there could point the restore at an arbitrary file even
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* though `source`/`manifestPath` both passed containment.
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*/
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describe('restore path allowlist — manifest database.backup_file containment (GHSA-xfvx)', () => {
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let tmpRoot;
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beforeAll(async () => {
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await setBackupSetting('backup_destination_path', '/backup');
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tmpRoot = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'picpeak-xfvx-manifest-'));
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// Additional allowed root via the documented escape hatch — keeps this
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// describe block's fixtures out of the shared '/backup' root above.
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process.env.RESTORE_ALLOWED_ROOTS = tmpRoot;
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});
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afterAll(() => {
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delete process.env.RESTORE_ALLOWED_ROOTS;
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fs.rmSync(tmpRoot, { recursive: true, force: true });
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});
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const writeManifest = (name, databaseSection) => {
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const manifestPath = path.join(tmpRoot, name);
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fs.writeFileSync(manifestPath, JSON.stringify({
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manifest: { version: '1.0', id: 'test' },
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backup: { type: 'full' },
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system: { platform: 'linux' },
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application: { version: '1.0.0' },
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files: { count: 0, manifest: [] },
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database: databaseSection,
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verification: { total_checksum: null, checksum_algorithm: null },
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}));
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return manifestPath;
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};
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it('rejects a manifest whose database.backup_file is an absolute path outside every configured root', async () => {
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const manifestPath = writeManifest('evil-1.json', { backup_file: '/etc/passwd' });
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const err = await checkRestorePathsAllowed({ source: 'local', manifestPath });
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expect(err).toMatch(/database\.backup_file must be inside a configured backup location/i);
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});
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it('accepts a manifest whose database.backup_file is an absolute path inside a configured root', async () => {
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const dbFile = path.join(tmpRoot, 'database', 'picpeak-db-sqlite-1.sql.gz');
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fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(dbFile), { recursive: true });
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fs.writeFileSync(dbFile, 'not a real sqlite dump, just a fixture');
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const manifestPath = writeManifest('legit-1.json', { backup_file: dbFile });
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const err = await checkRestorePathsAllowed({ source: 'local', manifestPath });
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expect(err).toBeNull();
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});
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it('does not choke on a manifest whose database.backup_file is a legitimate relative path', async () => {
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// Relative candidates are resolved against restoreService's own
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// `backupPath` (which this route-level pre-check doesn't have — it only
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// sees `source`/`manifestPath`), so this layer intentionally defers
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// relative-path containment to restoreService.performDatabaseRestore
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// and must not false-positive here.
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const manifestPath = writeManifest('legit-2.json', { backup_file: 'database/picpeak-db-sqlite-1.sql.gz' });
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const err = await checkRestorePathsAllowed({ source: 'local', manifestPath });
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expect(err).toBeNull();
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});
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it('rejects everything when no backup location is configured at all (fail closed, not fail open)', async () => {
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// Simulate an install that never had backup_destination_path /
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// backup_manifest_path seeded/configured, and isn't using the
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// RESTORE_ALLOWED_ROOTS escape hatch either.
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const savedRoots = process.env.RESTORE_ALLOWED_ROOTS;
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delete process.env.RESTORE_ALLOWED_ROOTS;
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await db('app_settings').whereIn('setting_key', ['backup_destination_path', 'backup_manifest_path']).del();
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try {
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const err = await checkRestorePathsAllowed({
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source: '/backup/run-1', manifestPath: '/backup/run-1/manifest.json',
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});
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expect(err).toMatch(/no backup location is configured/i);
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} finally {
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process.env.RESTORE_ALLOWED_ROOTS = savedRoots;
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await setBackupSetting('backup_destination_path', '/backup');
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}
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});
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});
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