fix(security): vet the destination project when linking a deal (#991)

linkDealToProject re-points a deal's quotes, contracts and events into
`projectId`. Its lineage guard vets the SOURCE events and its comment assumed
the route had vetted the destination — true only for attachDocumentToProject.
quoteService.create/update and contract crud.create/update take `projectId`
straight from the request body behind quotes.manage / contracts.manage, which
are permissions, not ownership; adminQuotes.js and adminContracts.js carry no
ownership guard at all.

The lineage guard did not cover it: it is skipped when the deal has produced no
event yet, which is the state of a newly created quote, and an unassigned
destination ADOPTS the deal's customer rather than rejecting it.

A scoped admin could therefore write into another admin's project, and on an
OWNERLESS project (created_by IS NULL — legacy rows migration 167 could not
attribute) escalate to a read: once the quote converts to an event it becomes
the project's only linked event, which is the condition ownedProjectsSubquery's
second branch grants ownership on.

Vetted at the service choke point all four callers share, ahead of both the
null-deal early return (callers write project_id before calling, and deal_uuid
is nullable) and the customer check (whose 422 vs 404 was an enumeration
oracle). 404 PROJECT_NOT_FOUND throughout. super_admin unaffected.
This commit is contained in:
Paul Nothaft
2026-08-04 16:36:12 +02:00
committed by GitHub
parent 083b3d86b0
commit 0c8ad6bbed
2 changed files with 148 additions and 4 deletions
@@ -135,4 +135,95 @@ describe('linkDealToProject enforces lineage ownership (GHSA-wrg5, round 3)', ()
projectService.assignQuote(project, quoteId, { id: editorA }),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'DEAL_EVENT_FORBIDDEN' });
});
// The lineage guard above only fires once a deal has produced an event. The
// quote/contract create+update paths call linkDealToProject with a
// body-supplied projectId and NO route-level ownership guard, so a brand-new
// deal (eventIds empty) skipped every check and wrote into a foreign project.
describe('destination ownership (codex review follow-up)', () => {
it('refuses a foreign project even when the deal has no events yet', async () => {
const victimProject = await mkProject('victim-destination', editorB);
const quoteId = await mkQuote('deal-no-events', null);
await expect(
projectService.linkDealToProject('deal-no-events', victimProject, db, { id: editorA }),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'PROJECT_NOT_FOUND' });
const q = await db('quotes').where({ id: quoteId }).first('project_id');
expect(q.project_id == null).toBe(true);
});
it('refuses an OWNERLESS project with no events (the escalation path)', async () => {
// created_by NULL + no linked events is exactly the shape that would let
// the caller claim the project via ownedProjectsSubquery's second branch
// once their quote converts to an event.
const orphan = await mkProject('orphan-destination', null);
await mkQuote('deal-orphan', null);
await expect(
projectService.linkDealToProject('deal-orphan', orphan, db, { id: editorA }),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'PROJECT_NOT_FOUND' });
});
it("still allows the caller's own project with no events", async () => {
const own = await mkProject('own-destination', editorA);
const quoteId = await mkQuote('deal-own-dest', null);
await projectService.linkDealToProject('deal-own-dest', own, db, { id: editorA });
const q = await db('quotes').where({ id: quoteId }).first('project_id');
expect(Number(q.project_id)).toBe(Number(own));
});
it('refuses a foreign project when the deal_uuid is NULL (codex round 1)', async () => {
// deal_uuid is nullable (migration 107) and quoteService.update passes the
// EXISTING row's value, so a legacy quote reaches linkDealToProject with
// null. The old `if (!dealUuid || !projectId) return` bailed before the
// guard — while the caller had already written project_id onto its row.
const victimProject = await mkProject('victim-nulldeal', editorB);
await expect(
projectService.linkDealToProject(null, victimProject, db, { id: editorA }),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'PROJECT_NOT_FOUND' });
});
it('still no-ops on a NULL deal_uuid pointed at the caller-s own project', async () => {
// The destination is vetted, then it returns without cascading — there is
// no lineage to move.
const own = await mkProject('own-nulldeal', editorA);
await expect(
projectService.linkDealToProject(null, own, db, { id: editorA }),
).resolves.toBeUndefined();
});
it('does not leak customer association through the error code', async () => {
// The customer check used to run first, so a foreign project whose
// customer differed answered 422 PROJECT_CUSTOMER_MISMATCH while an
// unknown id answered 404 — enough to enumerate projects and infer their
// customer. Both must now be indistinguishable to a scoped caller.
const foreignWithCustomer = await mkProject('victim-customer', editorB);
await db('projects').where({ id: foreignWithCustomer }).update({ customer_account_id: customerId });
await mkQuote('deal-oracle', null);
await expect(
projectService.linkDealToProject('deal-oracle', foreignWithCustomer, db, { id: editorA }),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'PROJECT_NOT_FOUND' });
await expect(
projectService.linkDealToProject('deal-oracle', 999999, db, { id: editorA }),
).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'PROJECT_NOT_FOUND' });
});
it('leaves super_admin unrestricted on a foreign destination', async () => {
const victimProject = await mkProject('root-destination', editorB);
const quoteId = await mkQuote('deal-root-dest', null);
await projectService.linkDealToProject('deal-root-dest', victimProject, db, {
id: superAdmin, roleName: 'super_admin',
});
const q = await db('quotes').where({ id: quoteId }).first('project_id');
expect(Number(q.project_id)).toBe(Number(victimProject));
});
});
});